Supreme Court U.S.
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No. _____

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

FRANK X. HOPKINS,
Warden of the Nebraska State Penitentiary,

Petitioner,

v.

JOHN BYRON NEWMAN,

Respondent.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Eighth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I.

Whether the opinion of the Circuit Court for the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals following remand from this court violates the doctrine of *Estelle v. McGuire*, 502 U.S. 62, 112 S. Ct. 475, 116 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1991) by imposing its own interpretation of state law on the state of Nebraska.

II.

Whether the use by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit of the standard of review for harmless constitutional error established in *Chapman v. California*, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967) in certain § 2254 cases violates this Court's ruling in *Brecht v. Abrahamson*, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 123 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1993) and whether it creates an intolerable split of authority among the circuit courts.

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First Opinion

The first opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit overturning the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief is reported at 192 F.3d 1132 (8th Cir. 1999), (hereinafter *Newman I*) and is included in the Appendix at App. 1-10. The November 22, 1999 decision not to grant rehearing and rehearing en banc does not appear to be reported, but is included in the Appendix at App. 60. The district court's order denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus is reported at 6 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (D. Nebr. 1998) and is included in the Appendix at App. 49-55.

Second Opinion

Pursuant to our first Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this Court, this case was remanded to the Circuit Court for reconsideration in light of the standard of deference which is to be afforded state court determinations on the merits in federal habeas corpus proceedings established in *Williams v. Taylor*, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000). The second opinion of the Court of Appeals is found at *Newman v. Hopkins*, 247 F.3d 848 (8th Cir. 2001) (hereinafter *Newman II)* and is included in the Appendix at App. 12-20. The June 1, 2001 decision to deny rehearing does not appear to be reported, but is noted in the Appendix at App. 12.

JURISDICTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit filed its most recent opinion on April 27, 2001. App. 12-20. The motion for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied by that court on June 1, 2001. App. 12. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 13.1, the petition for writ of certiorari is required to be filed within 90 days of the denial of the motion for rehearing en banc; however, Respondent sought and was granted an extension of time in which to file his petition until October 29, 2001. App. 23. Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

Constitution of the United States, Fifth Amendment.

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No

State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Constitution of the United States, Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

Constitution of the United States, Sixth Amendment.

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim –

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is the second time Respondent has sought a writ of certiorari from this Court in this case.

Newman was convicted of first degree sexual assault, a violation of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-319, a Class II felony, with enhanced penalties for second and subsequent offenses to which Newman was subject by virtue of his past record. The evidence at trial showed that Newman forced his way into the victim's apartment in the early morning hours of March 21, 1993, and raped her while her 3 year old son slept nearby. He sexually assaulted her in the living room, then carried her into the bedroom and repeated his sexual assault on her there. After the assault, she called the Lincoln Police Department from a telephone to which Newman had not cut the cord. Police arrived shortly after her call, and she described her assailant as an Hispanic male between 5 feet 6 inches and 5 feet 8 inches, olive complexion, dark brown or black hair and mustache, wearing a white T shirt and black pants and black leather jacket. She also mentioned to the police that she thought she noticed a slight Hispanic accent, based on the way he pronounced some words. Sometime later, she was shown a set of six photographs and was asked if she saw her assailant there. She looked

them over and told police her attacker was not shown in those photos.

A couple of days after the assault, police assembled a second photographic array, and showed the photos to the victim. Again she did not see him in that set of photographs. On March 25, 1993 police brought a third set of photos to the victim to look at, and she immediately recognized her assailant, and pointed to photograph number 4, which portrayed John Byron Newman.

Subsequently, police learned that Newman had taken an Amtrak train to Las Vegas, and Las Vegas police arrested Newman on March 26, 1993 pursuant to a fugitive warrant issued by the Nebraska courts. On April 8, 1993 a deputy sheriff flew to Las Vegas to get Newman and bring him back to Lincoln, Nebraska to stand trial. The deputy testified at trial that he thought Newman had a bit of an Hispanic accent. Two other witnesses testified at trial that the day after the victim was assaulted, they saw a person, later identified by them in a photographic array as Newman, behaving in a singular manner.

The first witness, Russell Grady, testified that at about 12:15 a.m. on March 22, 1993, he saw a man following a woman about a quarter of a block behind him. Grady testified that this man was dark complected, and was wearing a black leather jacket and white tennis shoes. Grady saw him follow the woman to the doors of an apartment, run up to the doors and look in, then walk back to the sidewalk and stand looking at the apartment. A light came on in the top corner apartment, and Newman then walked away. Grady later picked Newman's

photo out of a photographic array as the man he saw stalking the woman.

The other witness, Julie Denny, testified that she too saw Newman on March 22, 1993. She arrived home at about 10:15 p.m. and, because she thought she had heard something dragging under her car, looked under it in the driveway of her apartment. When she stood up, Newman was standing behind her. He was wearing a black leather jacket and white tennis shoes. He began asking her if she knew a certain couple who purportedly lived in the apartment, and followed her to a set of stairs, asking her if she was married or had a boyfriend. Julie ran up the stairs into her apartment, and reported her encounter the next day to the police. Several days later, she was shown a set of photographs and she picked out Newman as the man who had accosted her. She testified that she did not notice any accent when he spoke to her.

At the close of the state's case, Newman sought to introduce a "voice exemplar" by reading a "fairly neutral" statement to show that he did not have an Hispanic accent. The state objected on the basis that it would be impossible to recreate the conditions under which he spoke the word to the victim. The district court sustained the objection, and held that Newman could testify in any voice he chose, but that he would be under oath and subject to cross examination. Without making an offer of proof, Newman rested without presenting evidence.

State Court Direct Appeal

The Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed Newman's conviction, and held that a defendant has a constitutional

right to give a voice exemplar without being subject to cross examination because such an exemplar is more akin to an identifying physical characteristic than testimonial evidence, and as such, he was not required to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination. *See State v. Newman*, 4 Neb.App. 265, 541 N.W.2d 662 (1995).

Newman filed a petition for further review pursuant to Nebraska Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Rule of Practice and Procedure 2 F and further review was granted by the Nebraska Supreme Court. It agreed with the Court of Appeals' analysis of the voice exemplar issue, and concluded "if relevant and reliable, a voice exemplar may be offered into evidence by a criminal defendant without waiving his or her Fifth Amendment privilege and subject him to cross-examination." *State v. Newman*, 250 Neb. 226, 244, 548 N.W.2d 739, 752 (1996). App. 38-63. The court found that although it was error to require Newman to waive his Fifth Amendment privileges if he read a statement, the fact that he had offered nothing to show that his voice exemplar would be sufficiently reliable to be entered as evidence, precluded a finding of trial error in refusing to permit the exemplar.

In so doing, the Nebraska Supreme Court cited with approval the rulings of *People v. Scarola*, 71 N.Y.2d 769, 525 N.E.2d 728 (1988) and *United States v. Esdaille*, 769 F.2d 104 (2nd Cir. 1985), *cert. denied*, 474 U.S. 923, 106 S. Ct. 258, 88 L. Ed. 2d 264 (1987) which places voice exemplars in a different category than other routinely admitted evidence because voice exemplars and accents are so easy to fake. The Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that because Newman made no attempt to satisfy

the state court requirement that the exemplar be genuine, the trial court properly excluded it. App. 57-61.

Federal Habeas Corpus

District Court

On December 11, 1996, Newman filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the District Court for the District of Nebraska. He claimed, among other things, that his due process rights were violated when the trial court refused to permit him to demonstrate his speaking voice without first waving his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination, and subjecting him to cross examination.

The magistrate's report and recommendation found that Newman's complaint was not grounded in a constitutional right, but was simply a ruling of state law, and that federal habeas courts may not examine such errors unless they are so egregious as to have fatally infected the trial and render it fundamentally unfair. App. 70-72. It stated that the Nebraska Supreme Court is the final arbiter of state law, including the Nebraska rules of evidence, and neither the rule as pronounced by the Nebraska Supreme Court, nor the application of it to Newman was shown to have met this test. The magistrate noted that the state supreme court noted that there was other evidence which "clearly pointed to the petitioner; the use of his voice exemplar in the 'accent/no-accent' conflict among the other witnesses would not likely have changed the outcome of the trial in any respect" and certainly did not render the outcome fundamentally

unfair. The magistrate recommended denial of the petition in all respects. App. 75.

On April 27, 1998, the district court adopted in all respects the magistrate's report and recommendation, and denied Newman habeas corpus relief. App. 76-82.

Newman filed a motion for a certificate of appealability on May 26, 1998 which was denied by the district court on May 29, 1998 as he had not made a substantial showing of a denial of any constitutional right. App. 83. On September 9, 1998 the Circuit Court directed that the certificate of appealability issue on two questions: Whether the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment constituted harmless error, and whether the refusal to allow Newman to offer his voice exemplar was a denial of any right under the United States Constitution. App. 84.

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals

First Opinion

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit overruled the order of the district court denying habeas corpus relief on September 29, 1999. It held that the United States Supreme Court's "decision in *Wardius* of a defendant's reciprocal right of discovery, when read in light of the Court's reference to *Washington v. Texas, see,* 412 U.S. at 474 n.6, reflects an expression of clearly established federal law that a defendant is entitled to introduce a voice exemplar without waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination." *Newman I,* at 1135, App. 6.

The court also determined that, under the *Chapman v. California*, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967) harmless constitutional error analysis, the refusal to permit Newman to offer his voice exemplar without waiving his Fifth Amendment privileges was not harmless error because that appeared to be the only defense he had.[1] App. 1-10. Hopkins' motion for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied on November 22, 1999. App. 60. The first petition for writ of certiorari followed, which this Court granted, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of *Williams v. Taylor*, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 639 (2000).

Second Opinion

Upon remand, the Circuit Court again determined that Newman's constitutional right to present a voice exemplar had been violated, but narrowed its decision to being an "unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court", rejecting its apparent earlier determination that the decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court was contrary to existing Supreme Court precedent. The Circuit Court reasoned that, because it perceived the state court ruling to be a per se bar on voice exemplar evidence, then Newman's

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[1] The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals alone utilizes the *Chapman* standard rather than the proper *Brecht v. Abrahamson*, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 123 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1993) standard when state courts have not reviewed the claim for harmless constitutional error.

See Orndorff v. Lockhart, 998 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1993), *cert. denied*, 511 U.S. 1060, 114 S. Ct. 1631, 128 L. Ed. 2d 354 (1994).

right to present a defense had been violated, since that was the only defense he proffered.[2]

The court again noted that this Court has not addressed the question whether a defendant has a constitutional right to present a potentially exculpatory voice exemplar, but went on to conclude that, because a defendant has a constitutional right to offer some evidence that might influence a jury's determination of his guilt, then there still existed a constitutional violation in refusing to remedy the trial court's refusal to permit Newman to offer his voice exemplar without subjecting him to cross examination.

The Circuit Court stated that it adhered to its holding in *Newman I*, and again reversed the district court's denial of the writ of habeas corpus. App. 12-20. Hopkins' motion for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied on June 1, 2001 and thus this petition for writ of certiorari follows.

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[2] We note that the state court record makes clear that Newman at no time made an offer of proof of his voice exemplar.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE CIRCUIT COURT'S PERCEPTION OF THE HOLDING OF THE NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT'S RULING AS A "PER SE" BAR ON VOICE EXEMPLAR EVIDENCE FLIES IN THE FACE OF BOTH THE STATE COURT OPINION AND NEBRASKA STATUTE, THEREBY VIOLATING THE RULE ANNOUNCED BY THIS COURT IN *ESTELLE V. MCGUIRE*, 502 U.S. 62, 112 S. Ct. 475, 116 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1991).

> "We conclude that if relevant and reliable, a voice exemplar may be offered into evidence by a criminal defendant without waiving his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination."

State v. Newman, 250 Neb. 226, 548 N.W.2d 739, 752 (1996); App. 59-60.

This above quoted portion of the Nebraska Supreme Court's opinion led the Circuit Court to conclude that the State Supreme Court has created a per se ban on voice exemplar evidence in the state of Nebraska. This mischaracterization of the ruling appeared first in *Newman I*, wherein the Circuit Court found that the Nebraska Supreme Court's failure to remedy the denial of Newman's right to present his voice exemplar without waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination forever foreclosed him from proffering an exemplar that might satisfy the reliability requirement because Newman was never given the opportunity to make a showing of reliability.

The Circuit Court has simply re-determined that the holding of the Nebraska Supreme Court constituted a per

se ban (apparently across the board, not just limited to Newman) on voice exemplar evidence, in spite of the test plainly set forth by the Supreme Court in its opinion, and therefore violated the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. The Circuit Court then proceeded to determine whether the "blanket exclusion" of such evidence constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. In reaching the by now foregone conclusion that it was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, the Circuit Court reviewed a number of other cases in which the state courts, either by statute or by case law, had precluded introduction of certain evidence, and concluded that the per se ban on voice exemplar evidence fell into the same category as *Davis v. Alaska*, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S. Ct. 1105, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347 (1974). The Circuit Court concluded that, since the per se ban on voice exemplar evidence eliminates both unreliable and potentially reliable evidence, then the rule established in Nebraska is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, and again ordered the case remanded for a new trial.

Nothing could be more clear by this point in time than the proposition that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law. *Estelle v. McGuire*, 502 U.S. 62, 112 S. Ct. 475, 116 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1991). The conclusion of the Circuit Court that the rule established in *State v. Newman*, 250 Neb. 226, 548 N.W.2d 739 (1996) constitutes a per se ban is a gross misreading of the opinion, and a violation of the doctrine established in *Estelle v. McGuire*, supra.

The Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion

> [I]f relevant and reliable, a voice exemplar may be offered into evidence by a criminal defendant without waiving his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

State v. Newman, 548 N.W.2d at 752.

It is still unclear how the Circuit Court can interpret the Nebraska Supreme Court opinion as a per se ban on voice exemplar evidence when the opinion itself is so very plain that it did not.

For the Circuit Court to re-interpret a simply stated rule of evidence established by the highest state court in a manner utterly contrary to that clearly expressed by the Nebraska Supreme Court violates the doctrine set forth by this Court in *Estelle*.

Estelle made it excruciatingly clear that "it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." *Estelle*, 502 U.S. at 67-68.

That this is a matter of state law is plainly evident by the opinion itself. It is categorized in the state Supreme Court opinion under the heading "Other Evidential Rulings", and it is addressed and resolved by the court simply as a matter of state evidentiary law. The state high court concluded that since Newman made no attempt to show that his voice exemplar was genuine, then it was ultimately properly excluded by the trial court. The conclusion that this is a constitutional violation was reached

by the Circuit Court in *Newman I*, and the court has not seen fit to re-examine that issue. The matter simply is not one of either constitutional magnitude or susceptible of constitutional interpretation. It is a matter of state evidentiary law, pure and simple.

Furthermore, the fact that Newman opted not to attempt to make an offer of proof of his voice exemplar, and thus no record exists upon which to determine its reliability, does not mean that his constitutional rights were violated. The Nebraska Supreme Court found that the trial court properly excluded the exemplar because Newman had not satisfied the state court admissibility requirements for such evidence. We are aware of no rule that constitutionally requires admission of **any** sort of evidence that has not met the state court's requirements for admission. Admissibility of all evidence is governed by the respective jurisdictions' rules of evidence, and the fact that a party cannot be constitutionally barred from offering certain evidence is a far cry from mandating that it be admitted, regardless of what deficiencies it may suffer.

State Statute

Furthermore, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3301 to 3304 (Reissue 1995) make it clear that voice samples are admissible as physical evidence and that no court order is required for their production in the course of a trial. Since Newman's voice exemplar is clearly admissible under state statute, then the conclusion of the Circuit Court that the Nebraska Supreme Court established a per se ban on such evidence is a determination that the statute is wrong, a resolution that is impermissible under *Estelle*.

This Court stated in *Estelle* "[i]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions." *Estelle*, 502 U.S. at 67-68. The Circuit Court may not interpret a state court decision harmonious with a state statute in a manner such that it obliges the opinion to conflict with a state statute.

There appears to be no dispute but that the trial court erred in requiring Newman to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination at trial in order to present his voice exemplar. However, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that ultimately it was not error to preclude the exemplar because Newman had made no attempt to satisfy the state court admissibility requirements for admission of such an exemplar. The Circuit Court, utterly misreading the Nebraska Supreme Court opinion, converts this into a constitutional infringement of the right to testify on one's behalf. Even *Rock v. Arkansas*, 483 U.S. 44, 107 S. Ct. 2704, 97 L. Ed. 2d 37 (1987) does not go so far as to require admission of evidence because it is all the defendant may have to offer.[3]

In short, the Circuit Court has created a constitutional right that does not exist. This Court has never held that there exists a constitutional right to offer a voice exemplar, either with or without waiving the Fifth Amendment privileges. There is no "clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

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[3] " . . . the accused, as is required of the State, must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence." *Rock v. Arkansas*, 484 U.S. 44, 55 n.11.

United States" which so holds, and thus no basis upon which the Circuit Court could have concluded that the Nebraska Supreme Court erred in not granting Newman relief for the trial court error in refusing to permit him to offer his voice exemplar.

Finally, we observe that the Circuit Court misapplies the *Williams v. Taylor* test for unreasonable application of clearly established federal law by ignoring that the Nebraska Supreme Court did not identify what it perceives to be the "correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions". The Nebraska Supreme Court at no time found there to be **any** federal constitutional question, let alone misapply this Court's governing principles with regard to that question. We also observe that the Circuit Court noted that this Court has never addressed whether a defendant has a constitutional right to present a potentially exculpatory voice exemplar. App. 17. Since this Court has never addressed the voice exemplar question, there can be no "correct governing principles" which the Nebraska Supreme Court could have violated. Before a state court can unreasonably apply clearly established federal law, we think there must **be** clearly established federal law to be applied at all. We do not believe that the Nebraska Supreme Court unreasonably applied federal law which simply generally permits a defendant to offer evidence on his behalf. We believe the clearly established federal law must be far more particularized than that general principle for a state court to violate clearly established federal law. *See*, e.g., *Roviaro v. United States*, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S. Ct. 623, 1 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1957), permitting the government to withhold the identity of an informant; *Riggins v. Nevada*, 504 U.S. 127, 137, 112 S. Ct.

1810, 118 L. Ed. 2d 479 (1992), holding that prisoners may not be given psychotropic drugs forcibly absent a finding of overriding justification and a determination of medical appropriateness. We believe that in order for there to be clearly established federal law on a subject, that exact subject must have been addressed by this Court so that there exists guidelines for the state courts to follow on the question. We note that while *Williams v. Taylor* also forbids a state court from unreasonably extending a legal principle from Supreme Court precedent to a new context where it should not apply and unreasonably refusing to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply, the Circuit Court did not ground its ruling, or even mention, those provisions of *Williams*. Instead the Circuit Court chose to rely on the vastly more general principle that a defendant has a right to present evidence in his own behalf in order to find that the Nebraska Supreme Court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in Newman's case. We think that this principle is far too generalized to support the Circuit Court's determination and resolution of the issue, and maintain the Circuit Court erred in so holding.

II.

THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS ALONE CONTINUES TO APPLY THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOUND IN *CHAPMAN V. CALIFORNIA* IN SITUATIONS IN WHICH A STATE COURT HAS NOT PERFORMED A CONSTITUTIONAL HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS. THIS IS CLEARLY CONTRARY TO THIS COURT'S RULING IN *BRECHT V. ABRAHAMSON*.

The Circuit Court in *Newman II* expressly stated that it "adhere[d] to our holding in *Newman I*." We interpret this to mean that the Circuit Court continues to adhere to its reasoning in that case, with the exception of that portion in which it found the Nebraska Supreme Court's opinion to be contrary to clearly established federal law as determined by this Court. Since it explicitly rejected that rationale from *Newman I*, but did not choose to reject its constitutional harmless error analysis in that case. We must therefore assume that the Circuit Court continues to adhere to its *Chapman* analysis. We again take issue with that analysis.

The Eighth Circuit, alone among the federal circuits, maintains there is still life left in the standard of review established by this Court in *Chapman v. California*, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967), even though the Circuit Court is performing a collateral habeas corpus review of a state court conviction. The Eighth Circuit continues to apply *Chapman* in cases in which the state courts have not undertaken a constitutionally harmless error analysis.[4]

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[4] *Chapman* requires that "the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error

The Circuit Court's reasoning is found in *Orndorff v. Lockhart*, 998 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1993), *cert. denied*, 511 U.S. 1060, 114 S. Ct. 1631, 128 L. Ed. 2d 354 (1994). It asserted that since state courts, the federal district court, and the federal appeals court had all undertaken a harmless constitutional error review, and since *Brecht* holds that it is illogical to require a federal court to engage in the same approach to harmless error analysis that *Chapman* requires the state courts to engage in on direct review, then the federal courts must review the issue under the less stringent *Kotteakos* harmless error standard. *Orndorff*, 998 F.2d at 1430. But if the state courts have not had the opportunity to review the error at all, and the federal habeas court is the first to review a claim of constitutional error, then it should be the court to apply the more stringent standard, even if it is acting in a collateral review capacity. *Orndorff*, 998 F.2d at 1430.

This approach has been roundly rejected by every other circuit court which has had the opportunity to consider whether *Orndorff* is correct or if *Brecht* is the standard regardless whether the state courts have reviewed the issue.[5]

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complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." *Chapman*, 386 U.S. at 24. The *Brecht* standard, on the other hand, is remarkably more lenient in assessing the impact of the purported constitutional violation: the constitutional error warrants habeas corpus relief only if the constitutional error "had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." *Brecht*, 507 U.S. at 623.

[5] *Hogue v. Johnson*, 131 F.3d 466 (5th Cir. 1997) offers a listing of those circuits which have considered whether to reinstate *Chapman* or to hold fast to *Brecht*. *See Hogue*, 131 F.3d at 499.

Brecht itself demonstrates the fallacy of the Circuit Court's rationale. *Brecht* offers nothing that would justify use of the *Chapman* on collateral review. This Court simply did not restrict the application of the standard enunciated in *Brecht* to cases in which a petitioner had already raised the issue to the state courts under *Chapman*. There is justification for such an exception when *Brecht* does not even hint at such result. The reasoning of the Circuit Court is entirely at odds with the opinion of this Court in *Brecht*. The Circuit Court has set itself up as a "super appellate court" of state court decisions and has abandoned its role as a court of collateral review by continuing to use the *Chapman* "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in § 2254 cases. We do not dispute that the *Chapman* standard is entirely appropriate for a state court's direct review of its own conviction. However, as recognized by this Court in *Brecht*, the rationale for a more deferential standard of review in collateral attacks, such as habeas corpus, is appropriate if comity, federalism, and some measure of respect for the finality of state trials is to be realized. *Brecht* itself permits of no reason to believe that *Chapman* plays any role in collateral attacks on a presumptively valid state court conviction. Quite the contrary is true.

Brecht makes clear that "the costs of applying the *Chapman* standard on federal habeas outweigh the additional deterrent effect, if any, that would be derived from its application on collateral review." *Brecht*, 507 U.S. 619, 636, 113 S. Ct. at 1721. Further, this court commented that granting habeas corpus relief because there is a reasonable possibility that trial error contributed to the verdict is diametrically opposed to the traditional function of

habeas corpus – to give relief to those grievously wronged by society. *Id.* This Court concluded that a cost/benefit analysis of applying *Chapman* on collateral review resulted in more costs than benefits, and found application of a less onerous standard to be proper in a habeas corpus review of a state court conviction.

The split of authority regarding the proper standard of review appears to be inviolable at this point. The Eighth Circuit is obviously not disposed to reconsider its *Orndorff* rationale, and the rest of the nation's circuit courts have all rejected the bifurcated standard of review utilized by the Eighth Circuit. The situation we now face means that the standard of review for harmless constitutional error is dependant on the location of the defendant. The Eighth Circuit therefore uses varying standards of review, depending on whether the state courts have addressed the issue. The rest of the federal courts, with two exceptions,[6] use an entirely different standard. The grant or denial of habeas corpus relief should not be dependant on the location of the inmate who has filed for relief, and that is the situation we are currently in as a result of this split of authority among the Circuit Courts. This is at best a troublesome situation; at worst, it will grant relief in cases where relief is clearly not warranted,

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[6] It appears that two federal district courts are at least partially persuaded of the rightness of the Eighth Circuit's position regarding applicability of *Chapman*. *See Lyons v. Johnson*, 912 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), *aff'd*, 99 F.3d 499 (2nd Cir. 1996) and *Rickman v. Dutton*, 864 F. Supp. 686 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) *aff'd sub nom. Rickman v. Bell*, 131 F.3d 1150 (6th Cir. 1997).

and where relief would have been denied, if the defendant were just across the state line in a different jurisdiction.

Had the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the correct *Brecht* standard of review to a correct assessment of the facts, then assuming that it would have still found constitutional error, the outcome of the analysis would have been radically different. Had the Circuit Court evaluated the purported constitutional error to determine whether the exclusion of the exemplar "had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict", particularly in light of the Nebraska Supreme Court's finding that the properly admitted evidence amply supported findings that Newman committed the offense in question, the Circuit Court would have been obliged to reach a different conclusion. Had the Circuit Court recognized the record shows very clearly that the presence or absence of an accent was utterly immaterial to the identification of Newman as the rapist, since he was identified by the three main witnesses from a photo array, and had the Circuit Court then applied the proper standard of review, then it is clear the result would have been very different. Grossly mischaracterizing the facts, or at least not reading the record carefully enough to understand the manner in which Newman was identified, refusing to permit the Nebraska Supreme Court to interpret its own law, employing its own test instead of the appropriate test as formulated by the Nebraska Supreme Court, and doggedly refusing to apply the appropriate standard of review, has led to an intolerable and unjust result in this case.

Finally, the opinion of the Circuit Court is contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent and misconstrues the law on this issue. A federal court is not to grant a writ of habeas corpus unless the state court decision, evaluated **objectively** and on the merits, results in an outcome that cannot reasonably be justified under existing precedent as set out by this Court. *Williams v. Taylor*, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000). As noted by this Court in finding constitutional the categorical exclusion of polygraph evidence in *United States v. Scheffer*, 523 U.S. 303, 118 S. Ct. 1261, 140 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1998) "a defendant's interest in presenting such evidence may thus bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process." 523 U.S. at 308. Even if the Nebraska Supreme Court had created a rule absolutely precluding the admission of voice exemplar evidence (which it clearly did not), it would not be an unreasonable application of this Court's precedent. The Circuit Court split hairs in finding that, while the polygraph requires expert testimony, the voice exemplar would not, and thus the exemplar should be required to be admitted in all circumstances. This is a purely subjective rather than objective evaluation of the rule, and it violates the rule established in *Scheffer*.

CONCLUSION

The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has violated the doctrine established by this Court in *Estelle v. McGuire*, 502 U.S. 62, 112 S. Ct. 475, 116 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1991) by refusing to permit the Nebraska Supreme Court to interpret its own law, and by creating its own

version of the facts and law in the case to justify the result it has reached. There is nothing in the jurisprudence of this Court that would justify the finding that a defendant has a constitutional right to offer a voice exemplar at trial when that exemplar does not comport with the state law requirements for its admission. The clearly established federal law as determined by this Court simply does not create any such constitutional right, and consequently, there can be no decision that unreasonably applies law that does not exist.

The Circuit Court has also repeatedly and doggedly refused to abide by this Court's decision in *Brecht v. Abrahamson*, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 123 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1993). It continues to apply a standard of review to federal habeas corpus decisions which is appropriate only to direct review of cases, not to collateral review situations such as federal habeas corpus. It will not reconsider its singular and firmly entrenched position that *Chapman* is the standard that must be applied on collateral review of federal habeas corpus cases in which a state court has not been presented with the opportunity to consider a claim of constitutional harmless error. Nothing in *Brecht* would even hint at such a result, and the Circuit Court's intractable position has created a distinct split of authority among the Circuit Courts. That split must be mended if we are to establish uniform meaning and application of the federal constitution

throughout the nation, and we therefore ask this Court to grant our Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

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App. 1

United States Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit.

John Byron **NEWMAN**, Appellant,

v.

Frank X. **HOPKINS**, Appellee.

No. 98-2445.

Submitted: April 22, 1999.
Filed: Sept. 29, 1999.

John C. Vanderslice, Lincoln, NE, argued (Jennifer L. Gilg, Omaha, NE, on the brief), for appellant.

Kimberly A. Klein, Lincoln, NE, argued (Don Stenberg, Attorney General, on the brief), for appellee.

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD and WOLLMAN,[1] Circuit Judges, and WOLLE,[2] District Judge.

WOLLMAN, Chief Judge.

John Byron Newman appeals from the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We reverse.

I.

During the early morning hours of March 22, 1993, police officers in Lincoln, Nebraska, responded to an emergency call from the victim of a sexual assault. The victim provided the police with a description of her

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[1] Roger L. Wollman became Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on April 24, 1999.

[2] The Honorable Charles R. Wolle, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.

attacker, including the facts that he was wearing a black leather jacket and that he spoke with a Hispanic accent. A few days later, the victim identified Newman as her attacker from a photographic array arranged by the police. Newman was subsequently arrested in Las Vegas, Nevada, and extradited to Nebraska to face criminal charges.

Newman's first trial ended in a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a verdict, but his second trial resulted in a conviction for first-degree sexual assault. *See* Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-319(1). The state trial court sentenced him to twenty-five to fifty years' imprisonment without parole.

Newman's conviction was affirmed on appeal by the Nebraska Court of Appeals, *see State v. Newman*, 4 Neb.App. 265, 541 N.W.2d 662 (1995), and the Nebraska Supreme Court, *see State v. Newman*, 250 Neb. 226, 548 N.W.2d 739 (1996). He then filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

II.

We granted a certificate of appealability on two issues: (1) whether evidence admitted at Newman's trial was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and (2) whether Newman was denied due process of law when the trial court ruled that he would waive his privilege against self-incrimination and subject himself to cross-examination if he presented a voice exemplar to the jury. In reviewing these issues, we apply a presumption of correctness to the state court findings of fact. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). In the circumstances of this case, we

may grant the writ only if the state court's adjudication of the federal constitutional claim "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." *Id.* § 2254(d)(1).

A.

On appeal following his conviction, Newman argued that evidence introduced at his trial – a black leather jacket that Las Vegas police officers had taken from one of Newman's suitcases – was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Although the Nebraska Court of Appeals and the Nebraska Supreme Court agreed with Newman that the state trial court had erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence, both courts held that because the victim gave a detailed description of her attacker's physical characteristics and had identified Newman from a photo in which he was not wearing a black leather jacket, as had two other witnesses, the error in admitting the jacket into evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. *See Newman,* 541 N.W.2d at 672-73; *Newman,* 548 N.W.2d at 749.

The district court held that Newman's Fourth Amendment claim was barred by *Stone v. Powell,* 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), in which the Supreme Court held that a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas relief on a Fourth Amendment claim if the state has provided for "full and fair litigation" of that claim. *See id.* at 494, 96 S.Ct. 3037. We have held that such a claim is cognizable under section 2254

only if "the state provided no procedure by which the prisoner could raise his Fourth Amendment claim, or the prisoner was foreclosed from using that procedure because of an unconscionable breakdown in the system." *Willett v. Lockhart*, 37 F.3d 1265, 1273 (8th Cir.1994) (en banc), *cert. denied*, 514 U.S. 1052, 115 S.Ct. 1432, 131 L.Ed.2d 313 (1995). Accordingly, because it is undisputed that Newman was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim in the state courts, the State argues that *Stone* bars the reassertion of that claim in this action.

Newman counters by contending that *Stone* does not bar federal court review of a state court's harmless error analysis of a Fourth Amendment violation. This argument presents a nice question, but one which we need not address because, as will be seen, we are holding that Newman is entitled to a new trial, at which the challenged evidence will of course be inadmissible in light of the Nebraska Supreme Court's holding that it was error to deny the motion to suppress.

B.

Newman challenges his conviction on the ground that he was denied due process by the trial court's refusal to allow him to present a voice exemplar to the jury without waiving his right against self-incrimination. He argues that because the State can compel him to produce a voice exemplar without violating the Fifth Amendment, due process principles of reciprocity allow him to present a voice exemplar to the jury without waiving his constitutional protections.

The primary issue at trial was whether Newman fit the description of the attacker. An important component of that determination was whether Newman has a Hispanic accent. Newman asked the trial court for permission to present a voice exemplar, consisting of the reading of a neutral statement, to prove that he does not have a Hispanic accent. The trial court sustained the State's objection to the proffered exemplar, ruling that Newman could testify in any voice he wished, so long as he testified under oath and subjected himself to cross-examination. Given this choice, Newman chose not to present a voice exemplar.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right of an accused to "a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations." *Chambers v. Mississippi*, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). This right includes the right to present his own witnesses. *Washington v. Texas*, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). In *Wardius v. Oregon*, 412 U.S. 470, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 37 L.Ed.2d 82 (1973), the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause barred enforcement of a state notice-of-alibi rule that did not provide the defendant reciprocal discovery rights against the government. *Id.* at 472, 93 S.Ct. 2208. The Court noted that although the Due Process Clause says little about the amount of discovery a defendant must be afforded, it does "speak to the balance of forces between the accused and his accuser." *Id.* at 474, 93 S.Ct. 2208.

A defendant may be compelled to provide a voice exemplar over his assertion of a claim of Fifth Amendment privilege. *See United States v. Dionisio*, 410 U.S. 1, 6-7, 93 S.Ct. 764, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973); *United States v.*

Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967); *United States v. Leone*, 823 F.2d 246, 250 (8th Cir.1987). Accordingly, we conclude that the Court's recognition in *Wardius* of a defendant's reciprocal right of discovery, when read in light of the Court's reference to *Washington v. Texas*, *see* 412 U.S. at 474 n. 6, 93 S.Ct. 2208, reflects an expression of clearly established federal law that a defendant is entitled to introduce a voice exemplar without waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

The Nebraska Supreme Court recognized as much when, after discussing *Wade*, *Dionisio*, and *Schmerber v. California*, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), it held that "if relevant and reliable, a voice exemplar may be offered into evidence by a criminal defendant without waiving his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination." *Newman*, 548 N.W.2d at 752. The court went on to hold that the trial court "erred in effectively ruling that Newman's offer of a voice exemplar would waive his Fifth Amendment privilege and subject him to cross-examination." *Id.* Addressing the relevancy component of the test of admissibility, the court found that in view of the conflicting testimony with respect to whether Newman spoke with a Hispanic accent, "the presentation of a voice exemplar would have been relevant evidence going to the issue of identity." *Id.*

The court then addressed the question of the reliability of the proffered exemplar, referring to decisions which have noted the fact that by its very nature voice exemplar evidence is different from other common types of exemplar or demonstrative evidence. *See, e.g.*, *People v. Scarola*, 71 N.Y.2d 769, 525 N.E.2d 728, 530

N.Y.S.2d 83 (1988); *United States v. Esdaille*, 769 F.2d 104 (2d Cir.1985). *See Newman*, 548 N.W.2d at 752. Contrasting voice exemplar evidence with physical evidence such as scars and tattoos, the court said, "In contrast, voice exemplar evidence is relatively easy to feign. An accent can be exaggerated or muted through a person's conscious efforts, such as avoiding particular words that one cannot pronounce without an accent." *Id.* The court concluded that "[s]ince Newman made no offer to establish the genuineness of the exemplar, it would have been properly excluded as irrelevant. That is to say, in the words of the State's objection, the conditions under which Newman spoke to the victim could not be reproduced."[3] *Id.* Thus, reasoned the court, because the proffered exemplar would have been properly excluded on other grounds, Newman suffered no prejudice as a result of the trial court's erroneous ruling on the Fifth Amendment issue.

The question, then, is whether the Nebraska Supreme Court's failure to remedy the denial of Newman's right to present the voice exemplar without waiving his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination resulted in an outcome that cannot reasonably be justified under existing Supreme Court precedent. *See Long v. Humphrey*, 184 F.3d 758, 760 (8th Cir.1999). We conclude that it did,

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[3] With all due respect, we do not read the State's objection as having been based upon the ground stated by the court. Rather, as we read the record, the State argued that, contrary to the position taken by Newman's counsel, the Supreme Court's decision in *Wade* was not on point in that that case involved words spoken by a defendant during a lineup and not during trial.

for the effect of the court's decision was to forever foreclose Newman from proffering a voice exemplar that might satisfy the court's standard of reliability.

The State argues that the state court's decision constituted a ruling on a matter of state evidentiary law, a question that is ordinarily not cognizable in a section 2254 action. *See, e.g., Turner v. Armontrout,* 845 F.2d 165, 169 (8th Cir.1988). We disagree. We do not view the Nebraska Supreme Court's holding as constituting a ruling on the evidentiary insufficiency of Newman's proffered exemplar, for Newman was never given an opportunity to make a showing of reliability. Once the trial court ruled that Newman would be required to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the issue was closed, for there would have been no point in Newman's attempting to make such a showing in the face of that ruling. Rather, we read the Nebraska Supreme Court's statement that "the conditions under which Newman spoke to the victim could not be reproduced" as a *per se* rule of exclusion akin to that which the United States Supreme Court has held infringes impermissibly upon a defendant's right to testify on his own behalf. *See Rock v. Arkansas,* 483 U.S. 44, 56-62, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987). In any event, even if the Nebraska Supreme Court's ruling is viewed as one touching solely upon an evidentiary matter, we conclude that by in effect precluding Newman from attempting to make a showing of the voice exemplar's reliability, it infringed upon Newman's constitutional right to present a defense and thus is reviewable in an action for federal habeas relief. *See Wallace v. Lockhart,* 701 F.2d 719, 724 (8th Cir.1983).

There remains the question whether the error in requiring Newman to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege as a condition of introducing a voice exemplar was harmless. *See Olesen v. Class*, 164 F.3d 1096, 1100 (8th Cir.1999). Because the state courts did not review the claim for harmless constitutional error, we apply the stricter standard set forth in *Chapman v. California*, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), rather than the more deferential standard enunciated in *Brecht v. Abrahamson*, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). *See Harrington v. Iowa*, 109 F.3d 1275, 1279 (8th Cir.1997); *Orndorff v. Lockhart*, 998 F.2d 1426, 1430 (8th Cir.1993). Under *Chapman*, "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824.

As the Nebraska Supreme Court stated, "The central issue at trial was the identity of the perpetrator of the crime." *Newman*, 548 N.W.2d at 752. Whether Newman has a Hispanic accent was an important factor in determining whether he fit the description of the attacker. It is of more than passing significance that Newman's first trial ended in a mistrial because the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict. Had Newman been afforded his due-process right to introduce the voice exemplar, the jury might well have reached a different conclusion in the second trial. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court's erroneous ruling was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In so ruling, we recognize, as noted above, that the Nebraska Supreme Court held that what it considered to be overwhelming evidence rendered harmless beyond a reasonable doubt the erroneous receipt into

evidence of the black leather jacket, which the court viewed as merely cumulative physical evidence. We conclude that in the circumstances of this case the denial of the right to present what would have been exculpatory evidence had consequences far more serious than the erroneous receipt of inculpatory evidence of only marginal probative force. Newman's claimed lack of a Hispanic accent was apparently the only defense he had to offer. There may be cases in which the wrongful exclusion of such evidence might be considered harmless, but we conclude that this is not one of them.

Although on retrial Newman will be entitled to offer a voice exemplar without waiving his privilege against self-incrimination, he will of course be required to establish its reliability. *See Esdaille*, 769 F.2d at 107 (holding that proposed voice exemplar was properly excluded as unreliable). Whether he is able to do so will be a matter for the state courts to decide.

The judgment denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court with instructions to enter a writ discharging Newman from custody unless the state, within a reasonable period of time, grants him a new trial.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20543

April 24, 2000

Ms. Kimberly A. Klein
Assistant Attorney General
P. O. Box 98920
Lincoln, NE 68509-8920

RE: Frank X. Hopkins, Warden
v. John Byron Newman
No. 99-1401

Dear Ms. Klein:

The Court today entered the following order in the above entitled case:

The motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit for further consideration in light of Terry Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. ___ (2000).

Sincerely,

/s/ William K. Suter
William K. Suter, Clerk

United States Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit.

John Byron NEWMAN, Appellant,

v.

Frank X. HOPKINS, Appellee.

No. 98-2445.

Submitted: July 3, 2000.

Filed: April 27, 2001.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc
Denied June 1, 2001.

Before WOLLMAN, Chief Judge, RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge, and WOLLE,[1] District Judge.

WOLLMAN, Chief Judge.

In *Newman v. Hopkins*, 192 F.3d 1132 (8th Cir.1999) (*Newman I*), we reversed the district court's denial of a writ of habeas corpus to John Byron Newman, who is serving a twenty-five to fifty-year sentence on his conviction in a Nebraska state court on a charge of first-degree sexual assault. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated our judgment, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of the Court's holding in *Williams v. Taylor*, 529 U.S. 362, 404-05, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). *Hopkins v. Newman*, 529 U.S. 1084, 120 S.Ct. 1716, 146 L.Ed.2d 639 (2000). Having reviewed the case in the light of *Williams*, we adhere to our holding in *Newman I*.

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[1] The Honorable Charles R. Wolle, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.

I.

The facts of this case are set out more fully in *Newman I*. At trial, Newman challenged the victim's identification of him as her attacker from a photo line-up. Prior to picking out Newman's picture, the victim had given police a physical description of her attacker and told them that he spoke with a Hispanic accent. Newman sought to offer a voice exemplar to demonstrate that he had no accent, proposing that he be permitted to read a neutral statement aloud in order to allow the jury to hear his speaking voice. After the trial court ruled that introducing the voice exemplar would waive his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination and subject him to cross-examination, Newman chose not to offer the exemplar.

On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court ruled that the trial court erred in holding that offering the voice exemplar would have waived Newman's Fifth Amendment rights, but concluded that the error did not require reversal because Newman had made no offer of proof that the voice exemplar would be reliable, because an accent was easily manipulated by a speaker and because the conditions under which the victim heard her attacker's voice could not be replicated. The voice exemplar, it concluded, was so unreliable as to be inadmissible under Nebraska's evidentiary rules. *State v. Newman*, 250 Neb. 226, 548 N.W.2d 739, 752 (1996). The district court, construing the holding as a straightforward evidentiary ruling, denied Newman habeas relief. We concluded that the Nebraska Supreme Court's ruling was in effect a *per se* exclusion of voice exemplar evidence that infringed on Newman's right to present his defense and remanded the

case to the district court with instructions to grant the habeas petition and order that Newman be released or be given a new trial.

II.

Williams v. Taylor governs the degree of deference that must be afforded to state court determinations on the merits in federal habeas proceedings concerning state prisoners under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).[2] 529 U.S. at 402-03, 120 S.Ct. 1495. We decided *Newman I* under AEDPA, but before the Court's clarifying decision in *Williams*. Thus, the sole question before us on remand is whether, in light of the Court's articulation of the *Williams* standard, we correctly determined that Nebraska's *per se* exclusion of Newman's voice exemplar entitled Newman to habeas relief.

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[2] As amended, section 2254(d) states:

> (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim –
>
> (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

In *Newman I*, we framed our inquiry on review under AEDPA as "whether the Nebraska Supreme Court's failure to remedy the denial of Newman's right to present the voice exemplar without waiving his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination resulted in an outcome that cannot reasonably be justified under existing Supreme Court precedent." 192 F.3d at 1136. Thereafter, the Court announced the more elaborate *Williams* standard: A state prisoner may obtain federal habeas relief with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court only through a showing that the state court's decision was either (1) contrary to, or (2) an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. *Williams*, 529 U.S. at 404-05, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Because the Supreme Court has not considered the question whether a defendant has a right to present a voice exemplar in his own defense, the "contrary to" clause is not implicated in this case, and thus habeas relief was appropriate only if the ruling of the Nebraska Supreme Court amounted to an unreasonable application of federal law clearly established by the Supreme Court. *See Closs v. Weber*, 238 F.3d 1018, 1020 (8th Cir.2001).

"Under the 'unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." *Williams*, 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495. "Stated simply, a federal court making the 'unreasonable application' inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." *Id.* at

410, 120 S.Ct. 1495. A state court decision does not meet the AEDPA standard for unreasonableness simply by virtue of being erroneous. *Id.* In reading the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application of" language in AEDPA as two discrete sources of authority to review a state court's determinations, *id.* at 404-05, 120 S.Ct. 1495, the Court acknowledged that "[a] state-court decision that correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular case certainly would qualify" as an unreasonable application of federal law. *Id.* at 407-08, 120 S.Ct. 1495.

In holding that the voice exemplar was too unreliable to be admitted as demonstrative evidence under Nebraska law, the Nebraska Supreme Court ruled that

> voice exemplar evidence by its very nature is different from other common types of exemplar or demonstrative evidence. . . . [V]oice exemplar evidence is relatively easy to feign. An accent can be exaggerated or muted through a person's conscious efforts, such as avoiding particular words that one cannot pronounce without an accent. Since Newman made no offer to establish the genuineness of the exemplar, it would have been properly excluded as irrelevant. That is to say . . . the conditions under which Newman spoke to the victim could not be reproduced.

State v. Newman, 548 N.W.2d at 752.

In *Newman I*, we held that this holding amounted to a *per se* bar on a defendant's presentation of voice exemplar evidence, because the reliability determination was based

not on an individualized inquiry into the facts and circumstances of Newman's proposed voice exemplar but rather on characteristics common to all voice exemplars. 192 F.3d at 1136. On remand, we hold that Nebraska's adoption of a *per se* exclusion of voice exemplars constitutes an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the question whether a defendant has a constitutional right to present a potentially exculpatory voice exemplar, the right to present favorable evidence to a jury is clearly established by the Court's precedent. "Our cases establish, at a minimum, that criminal defendants have the right . . . to put before a jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt." *Pennsylvania v. Ritchie*, 480 U.S. 39, 56, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987). The role of evidentiary rules in the adversarial process is to "govern the orderly presentation of facts and arguments to provide each party with a fair opportunity to assemble and submit evidence to contradict or explain the opponent's case." *Taylor v. Illinois*, 484 U.S. 400, 410-11, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988). Although "[t]he accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence," *id.* at 410, 108 S.Ct. 646, "[t]he right of the defendant to present evidence 'stands on no lesser footing than the other Sixth Amendment rights that we have previously held applicable to the states,' " *id.* at 409, 108 S.Ct. 646.

Given that a defendant's right to present evidence stands on equal footing with other Sixth Amendment

rights, the Court's holdings concerning the blanket exclusion of evidence that tends to impeach the state's witnesses are of special relevance on the question whether Nebraska's *per se* rule constitutes an unreasonable application of federal law. In *Delaware v. Van Arsdall*, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986), the Court held that a criminal defendant who was not permitted to offer evidence that a witness was biased by the state's dismissal of charges against him "states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness." 475 U.S. at 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431. In *Davis v. Alaska*, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), the Court concluded that a defendant was entitled to present evidence of a witness's juvenile records despite a state policy of sealing such records, where effective impeachment of the witness required that "defense counsel should have been permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of witnesses." 415 U.S. at 318, 94 S.Ct. 1105.

In *United States v. Scheffer*, 523 U.S. 303, 315, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998), the Court noted that it had declared to be unconstitutional categorical exclusions of evidence that "significantly undermined fundamental elements of the defendant's case." The Court has thus struck down *per se* exclusions that categorically excluded a defendant's hypnotically refreshed testimony, *Rock v. Arkansas*, 483 U.S. 44, 62, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987), that prevented codefendants or coparticipants in a

crime from testifying for one another, *Washington v. Texas*, 388 U.S. 14, 23, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967), and that prevented a defendant from impeaching his own witness and from introducing evidence that the witness had confessed to having committed the crime of which the defendant was accused, *Chambers v. Mississippi*, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). In *Scheffer*, the Court concluded that the President's adoption of Military Rule of Evidence 707, which excludes polygraph evidence in all military trials, was "a rational and proportional means of advancing the legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence." 523 U.S. at 312, 118 S.Ct. 1261. In so ruling, the Court noted that "the . . . members [of the general court-martial] heard all the relevant details of the charged offense from the perspective of the accused, and the Rule did not preclude him from introducing any factual evidence. Rather, respondent was barred merely from introducing expert opinion testimony to bolster his own credibility." *Scheffer*, 523 U.S. at 317, 118 S.Ct. 1261.

In contrast to the situation in *Scheffer*, the Nebraska Supreme Court's imposition of a categorical bar on the introduction of voice exemplar evidence prevented Newman from offering factual evidence and significantly undermined his ability to establish the essential elements of his defense. *See Taylor*, 484 U.S. at 408 n. 13, 108 S.Ct. 646. As the Nebraska court recognized, the factual question whether Newman spoke with a Hispanic accent was relevant and potentially exculpatory. Unlike the polygraph evidence at issue in *Scheffer*, the record does not reveal that a voice exemplar requires the introduction of expert testimony, nor is there any indication that the

determination of its reliability lies beyond the ability of lay jurors to evaluate. We recognize full well that the state of Nebraska has a legitimate interest in the reliability of evidence, and if the facts and circumstances surrounding a particular voice exemplar make it so unreliable as to render it inadmissible under Nebraska's evidentiary rules, a defendant would have no absolute right to introduce it. *See Chambers*, 410 U.S. at 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038. Rather than balancing the state's concern with the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, however, Nebraska's *per se* rule bars not only unreliable evidence but also evidence that may, in individual cases, be reliable. This the state may not constitutionally do, for "[a] State's legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence does not extend to *per se* exclusions that may be reliable in an individual case." *Rock*, 483 U.S. at 61, 107 S.Ct. 2704. Nebraska's *per se* exclusionary rule impermissibly requires the defendant to "bear the full burden of vindicating the State's interest" in limiting the type of evidence that may be submitted to a jury. *Davis*, 415 U.S. at 320, 94 S.Ct. 1105. The decisions of the Supreme Court clearly establish that such a *per se* rule is unconstitutional. *Rock*, 483 U.S. at 61, 107 S.Ct. 2704. We therefore conclude that the Nebraska court's *per se* exclusion of voice exemplar evidence is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

We adhere to our holding in *Newman I*. Accordingly, the judgment denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court with instruction to enter a writ discharging Newman from custody unless the state, within a reasonable period of time, grants him a new trial.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

JOHN BYRON NEWMAN, Plaintiff, vs. FRANK X. HOPKINS, Defendant.	)	4:96CV3287 JUDGMENT ON REMAND (Filed Jun. 13, 2001)

In accordance with the mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, filing 55,

IT IS ORDERED that the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filing 10, is granted and John Byron Newman shall be discharged from custody unless the State of Nebraska on or before October 15, 2001, grants him a new trial.

Dated June 13, 2001.

BY THE COURT

/s/ Warren K. Urbom
Warren K. Urbom
United States Senior
District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

JOHN BYRON NEWMAN, Petitioner, vs. FRANK X. HOPKINS, Respondent.	)	4:96CV3287 ORDER ON MOTION TO STAY JUDGEMENT ON REMAND (Filed Oct. 16, 2001)

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Stay Judgement on Remand, filing 57, is granted; the judgment is stayed until further order of this court.

Dated October 15, 2001.

BY THE COURT

/s/ Warren K. Urbom
Warren K. Urbom
United States Senior
District Judge

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
WASHINGTON, DC 20543-0001

WILLIAM K. SUTER
CLERK OF THE COURT

AREA CODE 202
479-5011

September 5, 2001

Ms. Kimberly A. Klein
Assistant Attorney General
2115 State Capitol
Lincoln, NE 68509-8920

RE: Frank X. Hopkins
v. John Byron Newman
Application No. 01A205

Dear Ms. Klein:

The application for an extension of time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the above-entitled case has been presented to Justice Thomas, who on September 5, 2001, extended the time to and including October 29, 2001.

This letter has been sent to those designated on the attached notification list.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM K. SUTER, Clerk

By /s/ Jeffrey D. Atkins
Jeffrey D. Atkins
Assistant Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-2445	*	
John Byron Newman,	*	Order Denying Petition
Appellant,	*	for Rehearing and for
vs.	*	Rehearing En Banc
Frank X. Hopkins,	*	
Appellee.	*	

The petition for rehearing en banc is denied. The petition for rehearing by the panel is also denied.

(5128-010199)

June 1, 2001

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:

/s/ Michael E. Gans
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

JOHN BYRON NEWMAN,	)	
	)	
Appellant,	)	No. 98-2445
-v-	)	
	)	
FRANK X. HOPKINS,	)	
	)	
Appellee.	)	

APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR REHEARING OR REHEARING EN BANC

Comes now the Appellee (hereinafter respondent), by and through the undersigned, and states as follows in support of his motion for rehearing or rehearing *en banc* of the panel's opinion of April 27, 2001.

Standard of Review

Rehearing may be granted when a panel opinion overlooks or misconstrues a point of law or fact. F.R.A.P. 40. Rehearing *en banc* is warranted when a panel opinion conflicts with a decision of the United States Supreme Court, conflicts with another decision of this Court, or involves a question of exceptional importance. F.R.A.P. 35.

Why Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc Should Be Granted

The panel opinion in this case overlooks or misconstrues important points of both fact and law, and continues to grossly misinterpret the opinion of the

Nebraska Supreme Court. Further, the panel's opinion conflicts with the Supreme Court decision in *Brecht v. Abrahamson*, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993), and it also conflicts with the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in *Caspari v. Bohien*, 510 U.S. 383, 114 S.Ct. 948, 127 L.Ed.2d 236 (1994).

A.

THE STATE COURT DID NOT CREATE A PER SE RULE AGAINST VOICE EXEMPLARS

The panel's opinion grossly misconstrues the opinion of the Nebraska Supreme Court when it continues to insist that the Nebraska Supreme Court found no federal constitutional problems with Newman's proffer of his voice exemplar. The State high court held no such thing. Once the Supreme Court had found that the trial court erred in determining that Newman must waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination to offer his voice exemplar, the Nebraska Supreme Court then went on to find, as a matter of **state evidentiary law,** that Newman's failure to offer to establish the genuineness of the exemplar made it inadmissible under Nebraska law. The Nebraska Supreme Court did not, at any point, resolve whether Newman had a federal constitutional right to offer the exemplar and whether this "right" had been violated. The decision of the State Court involves application of pure state evidentiary law, and did not turn on a constitutional issue. The state court simply held that, because Newman never mad [sic] an offer to show that his exemplar would be both reliable and genuine, the trial court, while erroneously excluding it on Fifth Amendment grounds, ultimately properly excluded it as

irrelevant. *State v. Newman*, 250 Neb. 226, 244-45, 548 N.W.2d 739, 752 (1999).

Contrary to the insistence of the panel, the Nebraska Supreme Court made no effort flatly [sic] proscribe admission of voice exemplars. The Court would not have expended its energies in detailing the requirements for admission of a voice exemplar if it were going to ultimately conclude that under no circumstance would such evidence be admissible, and a plain reading of the opinion shows that this is not what it did. The panel continues to compound the error by analogizing the purported ruling of the Nebraska Supreme Court to cases wherein evidence was flatly precluded from admission because of state policy or state law. This is simply the wrong analogy to make, since the Nebraska Supreme Court made it clear that there are standards which govern the admission of voice exemplar evidence, and Newman simply did not even make an attempt to show that his exemplar would satisfy those requirements. As noted *infra*, no right exists in a vacuum and a defendant does not have an unfettered right to offer evidence at trial if it does not comport with the rules of evidence. We know of no jurisdiction that permits admission of evidence, regardless of what evidentiary problems are attendant to that evidence, if the sole justification for its offer is that it is all the defendant has by way of a defense.

The panel concludes that Nebraska's "per se" exclusion of all voice exemplar evidence (which, of course, it is not) is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law because it interprets a number of United States Supreme Court cases which have struck down

categorical restrictions on evidence sought to be presented by a defendant because the panel interprets these cases as holding that states may not categorically bar **any** evidence without first making some sort of determination that it should not be admitted for some particular reason. This was done by the Nebraska Supreme Court, but the panel absolutely ignores the holding of the Supreme Court that "if relevant, and reliable, a voice exemplar may be offered into evidence by a criminal defendant without waiving his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination." *State v. Newman,* 250 Neb. 226, 244, 548 N.W.2d 739, 752 (1999). Thus, the panel completely disregards the actual holding of the Nebraska Supreme Court. The panel's holding violates the principles of *Estelle v. McGuire,* 502 U.S. 62, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) which states that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law, and we would assume that would extend to instances when state law requirements for admissibility of a statement were not met by the person proffering the evidence, and there is no showing that clearly established federal law requires the admission of the evidence.

B.

IS THE OPINION OF THE NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT "CONTRARY TO" OR IS IT AN "UNREASONABLE APPLICATION OF" CLEARLY ESTABLISHED FEDERAL LAW?

Contrary to it's [sic] first opinion in *Newman v. Hopkins,* 192 F.3d 1132 (8th Cir. 1999), [hereinafter *Newman I*] *Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc denied,* November 22,

1999, the court now holds that the Nebraska Supreme Court's purported "per se" exclusion of Newman's request to offer a voice exemplar constitutes an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. In *Newman I*, this court stated that the Nebraska Supreme Court's failure to remedy Newman's denial of the right to present his voice exemplar without waiving his Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination resulted "in an outcome that cannot reasonably be justified under existing Supreme Court precedent." *Newman I*, 192 F.3d at 1136. While not at all clear, this appeared to be a ruling that the Nebraska Supreme Court's opinion was contrary to clearly established federal law, not that it was an unreasonable application of such.

Nothing about the nature or facts of the case has changed since the first opinion was issued by the panel, but now it has apparently determined that it was wrong the first time, and that it is not contrary to clearly established federal law, but the opinion of the Nebraska Supreme Court constitutes an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. We assume this change has been made as a result of *Williams v. Taylor*, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), which holds that a federal habeas court may grant writ of habeas corpus if the state court arrived at a conclusion opposite to that reached by Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Since there is no United States Supreme Court case that had dealt with the issue of the admissibility of voice exemplars, then obviously there is no question of law that could have been resolved opposite to that reached by the

Supreme Court nor was the case decided differently on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.

However, under the "unreasonable application" test, a federal habeas court may grant a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from Supreme Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. The panel takes the extraordinarily broad proposition that a defendant has a right to present evidence that might influence the determination of his guilt and, despite the number of cases that clearly put restrictions on this right, utilize this general principle from *Pennsylvania v. Ritchie*, 480 U.S. 39, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) to conclude that Newman's 6th Amendment right to present his defense, a voice exemplar of unknown reliability and relevance, was violated by refusing to permit him to present this evidence. It appears the shift from one test to the other was done in order to permit federal habeas corpus relief to be granted to Newman, since *Taylor* made it clear that relief was impossible under the original theory, that the holding of the Nebraska Supreme Court was contrary to establish federal law.

Furthermore, the panel closes its opinion by stating "We adhere to our holding in *Newman I*." Slip Op. P.8. We must therefore assume that the panel still maintains that the opinion of the Nebraska Supreme Court is contrary to clearly established federal law and that its original determination that *Chapman v. California*, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) and *Orndorff v. Lockhart*, 998 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1993) govern the standard to be applied in conducting a constitutional

harmless error review of the case if the state courts did not do so. We believe that this is error since the United States Supreme Court instituted the more deferential standard of *Brecht v. Abrahamson*, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). It appears that this circuit is the sole one in the nation to divide its review based on whether the state courts have conducted a constitutionally harmless error review or not.

C.

THERE IS STILL NO CLEARLY ESTABLISHED FEDERAL LAW ON THE SUBJECT

This court now opines that, while still conceding that there exists no United States Supreme Court case which directly holds that a defendant has a constitutional right to offer a potentially exculpatory voice exemplar, this "right" can be found this time in the rule established in *Pennsylvania v. Ritchie*, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) which very generically holds that criminal defendants have the right to put before a jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt.

However, not noted by this court is the corollary to that rule that "the accused does not have an unfettered right offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence." *Taylor v. Illinois*, 484 U.S. 400, 410, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988); *United States v. Scheffer*, 523 U.S. 303, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998). The Sixth Amendment is not a justification for presenting evidence because you have nothing else potentially exculpatory to

offer. All evidence offered by either party is always subject to admission under the rules of evidence.

Further, since the panel still adheres to its opinion in *Newman I*, then both the panel's opinions contravene *Caspari v. Bohlen*, 510 U.S. 383, 114 S.Ct. 948, 127 L.Ed.2d 236 (1994) which holds that a court cannot "stretch" previous Supreme Court decisions to have a case fit into a clearly established niche. Either there is clearly established precedent in a Supreme Court case dealing with that very topic, or there is not. A court cannot blend two Supreme Court cases to find a single constitutional right which "read in light of each other" then "reflects an expression" of clearly established precedent. It is clear that there is no United States Supreme Court case that analyzes the appropriateness of offering a voice exemplar at trial, and thus there is no clearly established federal law on the subject.

D.

THE PANEL UTILIZED THE INCORRECT STANDARD OF CONSTITUTIONAL HARMLESS ERROR REVIEW.

In *Newman I*, the panel erred when it determined that it must review the purported constitutional error under the stricter standard of *Chapman v. California* 386 U.S. 18 (1967) because the state courts did not conduct a constitutionally harmless error analysis, rather than the more deferential standard of *Brecht v. Abrahamson*, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). Since the panel continues to adhere to its holding in *Newman I*, then the ruling in that opinion must also be at issue.

It appears that this circuit is the sole one in the nation to divide its review based on whether the state courts have conducted a constitutionally harmless error review or not. It appears that all other circuits have determined that there is only the *Brecht* standard, a decision supported by *Brecht* itself.

Brecht divides harmless error review according to two criteria: whether they involved structural error, and whether they are before the court on direct or collateral review. There is no third grouping for cases which have already undergone constitutional harmless error review at the state level. *Brecht* simply holds that the *Kotteakos* standard applies in determining whether habeas relief should be granted because of constitutional error at the trial level. To insert *Chapman* type review strips *Brecht* of any real significance.

We recognize that this court has consistently applied *Chapman* in habeas proceedings when the state courts have not performed a constitutionally harmless error analysis. See, *Orndorff v. Lockhart*, 998 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1993). We also recognize that it creates an irrevocable split of authority in the circuits regarding the appropriate standard of review on habeas corpus of non-structural errors at trial. The United States Supreme Court has reiterated its directive that *Brecht* be applied at habeas a number of times, recently in *California v. Roy*, 117 S.Ct. 337 (1996), and *Calderon v. Coleman*, 529 U.S. 141, 119 S.Ct. 500 (1998). In *Roy*, the Court made it clear that the harmless error standards enunciated in *Brecht* and *Kotteakos* apply to trial errors when a federal court is reviewing a state court conviction. *Id*, at 338. We think it incumbent on this court, then, to amend its habeas review process to

conform with the pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court and adopt the *Brecht* standard for habeas review.

Had the *Brecht* standard been utilized, the result reached by the panel would have to be different. *Brecht* uses the standard established in *Kotteakos* which looks to determine if an error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. *Brecht*, 507 U.S. at 637, 117 S.Ct. at 1722. Using this standard, it is clear that the error, if error there be, in the state trial court's refusal to permit Newman to offer his exemplar would have had to be harmless because of the testimony from various witnesses that he did nor did not have an accent that they recognized, and because it could not have been offered because Newman did not make any attempt to show that his exemplar was reliable and relevant.

We would add that since *United States v. Scheffer* found it acceptable to bar admission of unreliable evidence, we think that a tension of sorts is set up between the right to offer evidence that one has not even pretended to show is reliable and the right to offer evidence in one's defense. Contrary to the continued insistence of the panel, the rule set up by the Nebraska Supreme Court does not impose an outright ban on exemplar evidence, as discussed supra. It is admissible if the requisite evidentiary requirements are met, and the Supreme Court opinion makes that abundantly clear.

Newman's case is unlike *Rock v. Arkansas* 483 U.S. 44, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 971e 37 (1987), in which a state law excluding all hypnotically refreshed testimony was struck down

because it violated the defendant's right to present a defense, largely because it deprived he [sic] jury of the opportunity to hear the testimony of the only person who was at the murder scene who was still alive. Newman's testimony would have been cumulative to that of Reverend Firnhaber who stated he heard no accent when Newman spoke, and of Julie Denny, who testified that she did not notice an accent when Newman spoke.

While we understand that the voice exemplar was the only thing that Newman proffered in his defense at trial, we would point out that none of the people who identified Newman in the photographic lineups which were shown to them, including the victim, used or indeed were able to use, the accent or lack thereof to identify Newman as the party they had observed. It goes without saying that photographs do not have accents, and the accent or lack thereof played no role whatsoever in the identification of Newman as the suspect in the rape. To permit Newman to make his voice exemplar without any showing that it is reliable or even relevant because it's all he has to offer by way of a defense makes a mockery of the truthfinding process which is supposed to be at the heart of the trial system. Since Newman made no attempt by way of an offer of proof to show that his exemplar was reliable, then the Nebraska Supreme Court was correct in finding that the trial court ultimately did not err in refusing to permit its use.

Conclusion

Because the panel opinion both overlooks and misconstrues significant points of fact and law, rehearing is

warranted. Similarly, because the panel opinion conflicts with at least two United States Supreme Court opinions, rehearing en banc is warranted, and we respectfully request that this court grant respondent's motion for rehearing or rehearing en banc.

Respectfully submitted,

STATE OF NEBRASKA, Appellee,

BY DON STENBERG, #14023
Attorney General

By /s/ Kimberly A. Klein
Kimberly A. Klein, #17716
Assistant Attorney General
2115 State Capitol
Lincoln, NE 68509-8920
Tel: (402) 471-2682

Attorneys for the Appellee.

PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF NEBRASKA)
) ss.
COUNTY OF LANCASTER)

I, Jan Wood, being first duly sworn, depose and state that one copy of the APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR REHEARING OR REHEARING EN BANC in the above

entitled case were served upon the Appellant by depositing said copies in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to Appellant's counsel of record John Byron Newman, 112 Federal Building, 100 Centennial Mall North, Lincoln, Nebraska 68508, on this 10th day of May, 2001.

/s/ Jan Wood
Affiant

Subscribed in my presence and sworn to before me this 10th day of May, 2001.

/s/ Barbara K. Smetter
Notary Public

GENERAL NOTARY-State of Nebraska
BARBARA K. SMETTER
My Comm. Exp. March 9, 2003

43-93-7

NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT

STATE OF NEBRASKA, APPELLEE, V.
JOHN BYRON NEWMAN, APPELLANT.
548 N.W.2d 739

Filed June 7, 1996. No. S-94-833.

Petition for further review from the Nebraska Court of Appeals, HANNON, IRWIN, and MILLER-LERMAN, Judges, on appeal thereto from the District Court for Lancaster County, EARL J. WITTHOFF, Judge. Judgment of Court of Appeals affirmed.

Dennis R. Keefe, Lancaster County Public Defender, and Webb E. Bancroft for appellant.

Don Stenberg, Attorney General, and Kimberly A. Klein for appellee.

WHITE, C.J. CAPORALE, FAHRNBRUCH, LANPHIER, WRIGHT, CONNOLLY, and GERRARD, JJ.

CAPORALE, J.

I. STATEMENT OF CASE

After the jury found the defendant, John Byron Newman, guilty of first degree sexual assault, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-319(1) (Reissue 1989), the district court held an enhancement hearing at which it was determined that this was not Newman's first such conviction. In accordance with the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-105 (Reissue 1989) and § 28-319(2) and (3), the district court then sentenced Newman to imprisonment for a period of not less than 25 nor more than 50 years, without the possibility of parole. Newman thereupon appealed to

the Nebraska Court of Appeals, asserting, in summary, that the district court erred in (1) not suppressing certain evidence, (2) other evidential rulings, and (3) finding the evidence sufficient to support the conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment. *State v. Newman*, 4 Neb. App. 265, 541 N.W.2d 662 (1996). Newman then successfully petitioned this court for further review. We now affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

II. FACTS

At approximately 11 p.m. on the evening of March 21, 1993, the victim fell asleep with her 3-year-old son while watching television in the living room of the Lincoln, Lancaster County, Nebraska, apartment in which they lived. During the early morning hours of March 22, she was awakened by a knock at the living room door. She got up and looked through the peephole and, seeing nothing, opened the door slightly. Now noticing a man outside, she asked if he had the wrong apartment. Replying that he did not, the man forced his way inside. As she backed away, the victim started hitting and kicking, and asked what he was doing. The man kept coming toward her and eventually pushed her down on the couch.

At this point, the victim was lying lengthwise on the couch with the man between her legs. As she threatened to scream, the man grabbed her by the throat and told her that if she did so, he was going to "bash [her] fucking head in." He then began squeezing her throat as he unfastened her belt and removed her clothing, which consisted of a green shirt, bra, jean shorts, underwear,

shoes, socks, and a white T-shirt. The man then opened his pants, pulled them down past his buttocks, and unsuccessfully tried to insert his penis into the victim's vagina.

The man next picked the victim up in a "bear hug" and carried her into a bedroom. Once there, he threw her on the bed and again attempted coitus. Being again unsuccessful, he inserted a finger into the victim's vagina. At this point, although she had never seen him and did not know him, the man spoke the victim's name and told her that he had wanted to do this for awhile. The man then attempted to muffle the sound of the victim's cries by putting a pillow over her face.

After awhile, he got up, turned on the lights, and threw a blanket and pillow over the victim's face so she could not see. He again made an attempt to copulate; when this effort also failed, the man asked the victim to "more or less jack him off." She refused and started hitting him with her fist. The man then suddenly stood up, turned off the light, and began to say repeatedly, " 'This didn't happen.' " The man next began putting on his clothes, all the while making sure that the blanket still covered the victim's face.

After the man had left the room, the victim stayed where she was until she heard a door shut. As she began to get up from the bed, the man came back into the bedroom and said, " 'I told you not to move.' " He then pushed her back down onto the bed, covered her head with a pillow, and left the room. The victim remained in the bedroom until she heard the man moving around and the door shut again. She then got up and went into the

living room to check on her son and tried to call the police, but discovered that the line to that telephone had been cut. She also found that the clothing her attacker had removed from her had disappeared.

The victim called the Lincoln police from another telephone in the kitchen. She was still on the telephone with the dispatcher when the police arrived. The victim described her attacker as a Hispanic male between 5 feet 6 and 5 feet 8 inches tall, with an olive complexion, dark brown or black hair, and a mustache, and as wearing a white T-shirt, black pants, and a black leather jacket. She also told the police that she thought her attacker had a slight Hispanic accent "because he was short with the words and things" and sounded different than what she was accustomed to hearing.

Using a dog to track the trail of the suspect leading from the victim's apartment, the police were led to a dumpster where they recovered the victim's missing clothing. At trial, the victim identified the recovered items as the clothing she was wearing on the night of the assault.

After giving the police an account of the events, the victim was taken to a hospital where she was examined. Sometime later, she went to the police station, gave a statement, and with the aid of a computer created a composite sketch of her attacker.

While at the police station, the victim was shown a photographic array which did not contain Newman's picture and was asked if she could identify her attacker from among the six photographs she was presented. Although the victim did not identify anyone as her attacker, she did

point out that some of the men depicted had features similar to those of her attacker.

On March 23, 1993, the victim was shown a second set of six photographs which did not include Newman and again was asked if she could identify her attacker. She did not identify anyone depicted in the array as her attacker.

Two days later, on March 25, 1993, the victim was shown a third set of six photographs. The police officer who presented the photographs told the victim to take her time in examining them. However, the victim testified that she "knew immediately who it was, what number it was," and selected photograph No. 4, a picture of Newman.

After the victim had identified Newman as her attacker, the police determined that Newman had taken an Amtrak train to Las Vegas, Nevada. The Nevada police were notified, and pursuant to a fugitive arrest warrant, Newman was arrested at the Amtrak train station in Las Vegas. Immediately upon being arrested, Newman was frisked and handcuffed. The police discovered no contraband or weapons upon his person.

Newman had three dark-colored, soft-sided suitcases with him. Without attempting to first open the suitcases, the police put them in the trunk of their vehicle and transported Newman and the suitcases to a detention center. When Newman arrived at the detention center at approximately 8:50 a.m. on March 26, 1993, the processing officer asked Newman if he had any valuables to declare. Newman responded that he did and listed on an "Inmate's Property Inventory and Release" form a black

wallet, two watches, a necklace, a $20,000 cashier's check, and bulk property composed of the three suitcases.

Later that morning, at around 10:30 a.m., the Nevada police contacted a Lincoln police detective and informed him that Newman was in custody. The detective asked if Newman was wearing a black leather jacket and white tennis shoes when he was arrested. Upon being told that he was not, the detective informed the police that the jacket and tennis shoes were needed as evidence. At approximately 11:15 a.m., two Nevada police officers went to the detention center property room and retrieved the requested items from one of Newman's suitcases.

On April 8, 1993, a Lancaster County deputy sheriff traveled to Las Vegas to pick up Newman. He logged Newman and his possessions, including the black leather jacket and white tennis shoes, into the Lancaster County jail on April 9. The deputy sheriff testified that he spoke with Newman during the trip, and it was his opinion that Newman had a Hispanic accent.

Newman filed a motion to suppress his identification in the photographic lineup and also filed a motion to suppress the jacket and tennis shoes.

At the suppression hearing, Newman and the State stipulated to the events following Newman's arrest. They also stipulated that it was the policy of the detention center to look through the suitcases for contraband, weapons, or explosives if they had not been searched by law enforcement officers prior to arriving at the detention center, but that no further inventory would be made before the suitcases were placed in the police property room. No warrant was sought or obtained to search the

suitcases, and to Newman's knowledge, they were not opened or searched for inventory purposes. The district court overruled both of Newman's motions.

Although at trial the State did not offer the white tennis shoes into evidence, the black leather jacket was offered and received over Newman's objection. In addition, at trial, the victim identified Newman as her attacker and identified the leather jacket seized from Newman as being similar to the jacket her attacker was wearing the night of the assault.

Newman also filed a motion in limine to bar the prosecution from offering the testimony of Russell Grady and Julie Denny, on the ground that their testimony was more prejudicial than probative. The district court denied Newman's motion, and the testimony of both witnesses was admitted at trial over Newman's objections.

Grady testified that on March 22, 1993, at about 12:15 a.m., he was sitting in his automobile waiting to pick up a friend. Grady observed that a woman was being followed about a quarter of a block behind by a man Grady later identified as Newman. Grady stated that Newman was wearing a black leather jacket and white tennis shoes. Grady saw the woman enter an apartment complex, after which Newman ran to the complex doors and looked in. Newman then walked back to the sidewalk and watched the building. When a light went on in an apartment in the right top corner of the building, Newman walked away.

Thinking Newman's behavior was unusual, Grady followed him and saw Newman walk to a building approximately two blocks from the victim's apartment. Grady drove around the block and continued to keep

track of Newman. After approximately 45 minutes from the time he had initially seen Newman, Grady flagged down a patrol vehicle and reported what he had seen to the police. Grady also gave the police a description of Newman and then left.

After a couple of days, a detective visited Grady at work and asked him if he could pick out the man he saw from a set of photographs. Grady did not select any of the photographs shown to him. A few days later, Grady was shown a second set of photographs at his home. This time, Grady selected Newman's photograph and at trial identified Newman as the man he saw on March 22, 1993. Grady also identified the leather jacket seized from Newman's suitcase as similar to the jacket he saw Newman wearing that night.

Denny testified that she saw Newman on the night of March 22, 1993. Denny left work at approximately 10:15 p.m. and drove to her home approximately eight blocks from the victim's apartment. When Denny got to her residence, she thought she heard something dragging under her automobile, so she pulled into her apartment parking lot and looked to see if there was anything lodged underneath. When she stood up, there was a man behind her. He was wearing a black leather jacket and white tennis shoes. He asked Denny whether she knew a certain couple living in the building and then followed her to some stairs. Denny testified that the man also asked her if she was married or had a boyfriend. Denny continued walking and then went up the stairs to her apartment. The next evening, she reported her encounter with the man to the police.

Approximately 2 days later, Denny went to the police station and attempted to produce a composite drawing of the man she saw. Several days after that, a police officer went to Denny's apartment and asked her if she could identify the man she saw from an array of photographs. Denny identified Newman in photograph No. 4 as that man. On cross-examination, Denny testified that the man who spoke to her that night did not have a Hispanic accent.

The prosecution also offered the testimony of Rev. Stewart Firnhaber. Firnhaber testified that he had met Newman in March 1993 when Newman went to Firnhaber's home for dinner. On that occasion, Newman was wearing a black leather jacket, a white shirt, and white tennis shoes. Firnhaber testified that Newman told him that he planned to travel by train to the west coast and then fly to the Philippines and on to Germany. Firnhaber testified that Newman did not have a Hispanic accent.

At the close of the prosecution's case in chief, Newman unsuccessfully moved for a directed verdict. He then attempted to introduce a voice exemplar by reading a "fairly neutral" statement to establish that he did not have a Hispanic accent. The State objected on the ground that the conditions under which Newman spoke to the victim could not be reproduced. The district court sustained the State's objection, ruling that Newman could "testify in any voice" he wished, provided that he did so under oath and subjected himself to cross-examination. Newman elected not to present any evidence.

III. ANALYSIS

1. Suppression of Evidence

In the first assignment of error, Newman asserts that the district court wrongly failed to suppress the pretrial and in-court identifications of him, as they were tainted by impermissible suggestions, and that the district court wrongly overruled his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his suitcases.

(a) Scope of Review

A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is to be upheld on appeal unless its findings of fact are clearly erroneous. *State v. Lopez*, 249 Neb. 634, 544 N.W.2d 845 (1996). In determining whether a trial court's findings on a motion to suppress are clearly erroneous, an appellate court does not reweigh the evidence or resolve conflicts in the evidence, but, rather, recognizes the trial court as the finder of fact and takes into consideration that it observed the witnesses. *State v. Mantich*, 249 Neb. 311, 543 N.W.2d 181 (1996).

(b) Application of Law to Facts

(i) Identification

In urging in the first part of this assignment of error that the district court should have suppressed the identification testimony, Newman argues that the police employed unconstitutionally suggestive identification techniques. He maintains that the photographic array shown to the victim was impermissibly suggestive and

that the police made statements to her which led her to pick his photograph. Newman argues that as a result, the district court should have suppressed not only the victim's pretrial identification, but her in-court identification as well.

Whether identification procedures in connection with photographic arrays were unduly suggestive and conducive to a substantial likelihood of irreparable mistaken identification is to be determined by a consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the procedures. See, *State v. Gibbs*, 238 Neb. 268, 470 N.W.2d 558 (1991); *State v. Price*, 229 Neb. 448, 427 Neb. 81 (1988).

Newman maintains that because his photograph was newer than the other photographs in the array, a subtle message was conveyed to the victim that he was the person who had most recently had contact with the law. Newman also maintains that out of the six photographs in the array, his was distinctive because it clearly portrayed him as the shortest and smallest of the men, a fact of no small significance in view of the victim's description of her attacker as a short man. In addition, Newman argues that the officer who showed the photographic array to the victim improperly influenced her because he told her that she did not "have to pick one out real fast." According to Newman, such a statement implied to the victim that she did in fact have to pick one of the photographs from the array.

An examination of the photographic array fails to support Newman's contentions. There is no apparent difference in the age of the photographs in the array, and we are unable to discern the relative heights of the suspects

depicted in the photographs. Nor was the officer's statement suggestive. We do not understand how any reasonable person would understand the statement, "Take your time. You don't have to pick one out real fast," to mean that a suspect had to be identified. The statement would be more reasonably understood to mean that one should take one's time in examining the photographs. The pretrial identification not being unduly suggestive and conducive to an irreparably mistaken identification, it could not have improperly tainted the victim's in-court identification of Newman.

(ii) Seizure

In the second part of this assignment of error, Newman argues that the evidence seized from his suitcase was obtained in violation of U.S. Const. Amend. IV and Neb. Const. art. I, § 7. Both the Fourth Amendment and article I, § 7, protect against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. *State v. Neely*, 236 Neb. 527, 462 N.W.2d 105 (1990). Searches conducted pursuant to a warrant supported by probable cause are generally considered to be reasonable. *Id.* " '[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are *per se* unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment – subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' " *Coolidge v. New Hampshire*, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). These exceptions are " 'jealously and carefully drawn,' and there must be 'a showing by those who seek exemption . . . that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.' " 403 U.S. at 455.

As no warrant was sought or obtained to search the contents of Newman's suitcases, the State has the burden of showing that the search falls within one of the established exceptions to the warrant requirement.

The State argues that the search was proper under the inventory exception and the "plain view" doctrine. According to the State, at the time Newman was processed into the detention center, he indicated that he had certain items of value in his suitcases which should be inventoried. Then, "[a]pparently, both as a result of Newman's statement, and as a result of their own policy to search the baggage for contraband, the luggage confiscated along with Newman was inventoried." Brief for appellee at 27. During the inventory search, the Nevada police discovered that the Lincoln police had requested the items and thus seized them as evidence. The State maintains that the seizure of the jacket and the shoes was permissible under the plain view doctrine because the police had a right to be in the suitcases as a result of the inventory search and because the items were in plain view with their incriminating nature immediately apparent due to the information from the Lincoln police.

The State's argument, however, is premised on a gross mischaracterization of the record. First, the record nowhere reflects that Newman told the authorities at the detention center that his suitcases contained items of value which should be inventoried. It is true that Newman listed his valuables on a form provided him, but he did not indicate that the three suitcases contained valuables which needed to be inventoried. The suitcases were merely listed on the form as bulk property. Second, although it was the policy of the detention center to

conduct an inventory search of the suitcases for contraband, weapons, or explosives before placing them in the property room, that policy was not followed in this case. The suitcases were inventoried as bulk property and not opened before being stored in the property room. It was only after the Lincoln police told the Nevada police that certain items were needed as evidence that Newman's suitcases were opened and searched.

Thus, in turning our attention to the applicability of the inventory exception to the challenged search, we consider the evidence as it is, not as the State misstates it to be.

Both the U.S. Supreme Court and we have consistently held that inventory searches after an arrest are permissible. *Illinois v. Lafayette*, 462 U.S. 640, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 77 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1983); *State v. Filkin*, 242 Neb. 276, 494 N.W.2d 544 (1993); *State v. Coleman*, 239 Neb. 800, 478 N.W.2d 349 (1992); *State v. Hill*, 214 Neb. 865, 336 N.W.2d 325 (1983). However, the propriety of an inventory search is judged by a standard of reasonableness, and such a search must be conducted in accordance with standard operating procedures. *Filkin, supra.* As we noted in Filkin, the reason for requiring standardized criteria or an established routine to regulate inventory searches is that

> "an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence. The policy or practice governing inventory searches should be designed to produce an inventory. The individual police officer must not be allowed so much latitude that inventory searches are turned into 'a purposeful

> and general means of discovering evidence of crime. . . . ' "

Id. at 282, 494 N.W.2d at 549, citing *Florida v. Wells*, 495 U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 109 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1990).

The purpose of the inventory exception, therefore, is not to avoid the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, but, rather, to advance legitimate governmental interests which include (1) protecting the property of an arrestee in custody, (2) protecting the police from groundless claims that an arrestee's property has not been properly safeguarded, (3) protecting or maintaining the security of a detention facility by preventing the introduction of weapons or contraband into the facility, and (4) ascertaining or verifying an arrestee's identity. *State v. Dixon*, 237 Neb. 630, 467 N.W.2d 397 (1991).

The suitcase search conducted here was not a routine inventory search. The officers were clearly engaged in a purposeful search for incriminating evidence identified by the Lincoln police. Because the search does not fall within the boundaries of the inventory exception to the warrant requirement, the district court erred in denying Newman's motion to suppress.

However, not all trial errors, even those of constitutional magnitude, entitle an accused to a reversal of an adverse trial result; it is only prejudicial error, that is, error which cannot be said to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, which requires that a conviction be set aside. *State v. White*, 249 Neb. 381, 543 N.W.2d 725 (1996); *State v. Trackwell*, 244 Neb. 925, 509 N.W.2d 638 (1994); *State v. Timmerman*, 240 Neb. 74, 480 N.W.2d 411 (1992).

Of those items that were unconstitutionally seized from Newman's suitcases, only the black leather jacket was admitted into evidence at trial. While the State would have been well advised to have left it out, the record reveals that this bit of physical evidence was cumulative. The victim gave a detailed description of her attacker which matched Newman's physical characteristics. She later identified Newman from a photograph in which Newman was not wearing a black leather jacket. Grady and Denny also gave detailed descriptions of Newman's physical characteristics and were able to identify him from a photograph in which he was not wearing a black leather jacket. In addition, all of these witnesses identified Newman at trial when he was not wearing a jacket. Thus, absent the jacket, the evidence that Newman perpetrated the crime was overwhelming. As a consequence, the erroneous receipt of the jacket into evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

(c) Resolution

For the foregoing reasons, the first assignment of error fails.

2. Other Evidential Rulings

In the second assignment of error, Newman challenges the district court's receipt of the testimony of witnesses Grady and Denny and its effective ruling that admitting the exemplar of Newman's voice would waive Newman's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and subject him to cross-examination.

(a) Scope of Review

In all proceedings where the Nebraska Evidence Rules apply, admissibility of evidence is controlled by those rules, not by judicial discretion, except in those instances in which the rules make judicial discretion a factor. *Floyd v. Worobec*, 248 Neb. 605, 537 N.W.2d 512 (1995); *State v. Carter*, 246 Neb. 953, 524 N.W.2d 763 (1994).

(b) Applicability of Law to Facts

(i) Testimony

Newman first argues that Grady and Denny's testimony should have been excluded because it was offered for an improper purpose and not for one of the purposes listed in Neb. Evid. R. 404, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-404(2) (Reissue 1995), which provides:

> Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he or she acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

In addition, Newman argues that even if the evidence was admissible under § 27-404(2), it was more prejudicial than probative and thus should have been excluded under Neb. Evid. R. 403, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-403 (Reissue 1995), which reads, in relevant part: "Although relevant,

evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. . . . "

It has been firmly established that § 27-404(2) is a rule of inclusion, rather than exclusion, and permits the use of relevant bad acts for all purposes except to prove the character of a person in order to prove that the person acted in conformity with that character. *Carter, supra; State v. Wood,* 245 Neb. 63, 511 N.W.2d 90 (1994); *State v. Perrigo,* 244 Neb. 990, 510 N.W.2d 304 (1994); *State v. Martin,* 242 Neb. 116, 493 N.W.2d 191 (1992); *State v. Stephens,* 237 Neb. 551, 466 N.W.2d 781 (1991). The list of acceptable uses recited in the statute is illustrative and not meant to be exclusive. *Carter, supra; Perrigo, supra.* However, evidence which is otherwise admissible under § 27-404(2) may be excluded under § 27-403 if its probative value is substantially outweighed by other considerations. *Wood, supra.*

Therefore, we review the admission of evidence of other acts under § 27-404(2) by considering (1) whether the evidence was relevant, (2) whether the evidence had a proper purpose, (3) whether the probative value of the evidence outweighed its potential for unfair prejudice, and (4) whether the trial court, if requested, instructed the jury to consider the evidence only for the purpose for which it was admitted. *Carter, supra; Wood, supra; Martin, supra.*

It is within the discretion of a trial court to determine the admissibility of evidence of other wrongs or acts, and the trial court's decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. *Wood, supra; State v. Bronson,* 242 Neb.

931, 496 N.W.2d 882 (1993). An abuse of judicial discretion means that the reasons or rulings of a trial court are clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying a just result in matters submitted for disposition. *State v. Parmar*, 249 Neb. 462, 544 N.W.2d 102 (1996); *Carter, supra; State v. Thomas*, 238 Neb. 4, 468 N.W.2d 607 (1991).

With these standards in mind, we turn to consider whether Grady and Denny's testimony was properly admitted at trial.

We first consider the relevancy of the testimony. Relevant evidence means any evidence having a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Neb. Evid. R. 401, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-401 (Reissue 1995); *State v. Simants*, 248 Neb. 581, 537 N.W.2d 346 (1995).

The testimony was relevant because it placed Newman in the area where the sexual assault occurred near the time it occurred. That being so, we must next determine whether the testimony was admitted for a proper purpose. It is clear that the purpose of the testimony was to place Newman at the time and place of the crime. This is a permissible purpose under § 27-404(2) because the evidence tends to show that Newman had the opportunity to commit the crime in question. There is therefore no merit to Newman's contention that the testimony was admitted for an improper purpose.

The question thus becomes whether the testimony should have been excluded because it presented a danger of unfair prejudice. For the purposes of this rule, the

probative value of evidence involves a measurement of the degree to which the evidence persuades the trier of fact that the particular fact exists and the distance of the particular fact from the issues in the case. *State v. Eona*, 248 Neb. 318, 534 N.W.2d 323 (1995); *Perrigo, supra*. Unfair prejudice means an undue tendency to suggest a decision based on an improper basis. *Eona, supra; Perrigo, supra*.

The testimony clearly had probative value. Grady's testimony placed Newman just a couple of blocks from the crime scene a few hours before the sexual assault occurred. Denny's testimony established that later on the same day as the sexual assault, Newman was approximately eight blocks from the victim's apartment. Any improper inferences that the jury might have drawn from the testimony of the two witnesses simply do not substantially outweigh the considerable probative value of their testimony. We also note that the district court gave a limiting instruction which admonished the jury that the testimony was to be received for the limited purpose of placing Newman in the area and no other.

Because the evidence admitted was relevant, had a proper purpose, had probative value outweighing its unfair prejudice, and was accompanied by a limiting instruction, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence at trial.

(ii) Voice Exemplar

Newman next contends that the district court erred when it in effect held that he would waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and be

subject to cross-examination if he presented a voice exemplar to the jury. Newman maintains that the court's ruling denied him due process of law because he was effectively precluded from offering the voice exemplar in his defense.

It is well established that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protects only against compulsion to engage in testimonial self-incriminating activity. *United States v. Wade*, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967); *Schmerber v. California*, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966). Both state and federal courts have usually held that the privilege "offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture." *Schmerber*, 384 U.S. at 764. See, also, *State v. Swayze*, 197 Neb. 149, 247 N.W.2d 440 (1976).

Thus, a defendant may be compelled to produce a voice exemplar because

> [t]he results of voice identification tests fall within the category of real or physical evidence. . . . In such a test, the speaker is asked, not to communicate ideas or knowledge of facts, but to engage in the physiological processes necessary to produce a series of articulated sounds, the verbal meanings of which are unimportant. The sounds alone are elicited for identification purposes through characteristics such as pitch, tone, intonation, accent, and word stress. The speech patterns of individuals are distinctive physical characteristics that serve to identify them just as do other physical characteristics

> such as color of eyes, hair, and skin, physical build and fingerprints.

People v. Ellis, 65 Cal.2d 529, 533-34, 421 P.2d 393, 395, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385, 387 (1966). See, also, *Wade, supra* (compelling defendant to produce voice exemplar did not violate Fifth Amendment). The U.S. Supreme Court has also held that there is no constitutional bar to compelling a grand jury witness to read transcripts of intercepted conversations into a recording device. *United States v. Dionisio*, 410 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 764, 35 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1973).

Newman urges that as the State could have compelled him to produce a voice exemplar without infringing on his Fifth Amendment privilege, due process principles of reciprocity demand that he be allowed to present a voice exemplar to the jury without waiving his privilege and becoming subject to cross-examination.

Other courts which have addressed this issue have held that due process reciprocity would allow an otherwise admissible voice exemplar to be introduced by a defendant without waiving his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. *People v. Scarola*, 71 N.Y.2d 769, 525 N.E.2d 728, 530 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1988); *United States v. Esdaille*, 769 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1985), *cert. denied* 474 U.S. 923, 106 S. Ct. 258, 88 L. Ed. 2d 264. However, these courts have emphasized that the nontestimonial nature of a voice exemplar does not automatically require its admission into evidence. The defendant must still show that the voice exemplar is relevant and reliable.

We conclude that if relevant and reliable, a voice exemplar may be offered into evidence by a criminal

defendant without waiving his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

Thus, the district court erred in effectively ruling that Newman's offer of a voice exemplar would waive his Fifth Amendment privilege and subject him to cross-examination. However, this does not necessarily mean that Newman was prejudiced by the district court's ruling, for the ruling may have been correct for other reasons.

The question is whether the voice exemplar was relevant and possessed sufficient reliability to be admitted. The central issue at trial was the identity of the perpetrator of the crime. The victim testified she thought that her attacker had a slight Hispanic accent. The other witnesses disagreed about whether Newman had an accent. The deputy sheriff who transported Newman back from Nevada testified that Newman spoke with an accent. But Denny and Firnhaber both testified that Newman did not speak with an accent. Thus, the presentation of a voice exemplar would have been relevant evidence going to the issue of identity.

That determination brings us to the question of the reliability of the proffered exemplar. For most exemplar or demonstrative evidence to be admissible, the proponent must show that the proffered evidence is reliable. In that regard, as other courts have noted, voice exemplar evidence by its very nature is different from other common types of exemplar or demonstrative evidence. *Scarola, supra; Esdaille, supra.* For example, the defendant in *People v. Shields,* 81 A.D.2d 870, 438 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1981),

attempted to display a 14- to 16-inch scar on his abdominal region that the complaining witness, a rape victim, did not mention. Since the *Shields* defendant proffered hospital records showing that the scar had predated the crime, there was no possibility of the scar's lack of authenticity. The same rationale has been applied to tattoos on a defendant's body. If a defendant can demonstrate that the tattoos predated the crime and that the crime victim would have had reason to notice the tattoos during the incident, it would be proper to permit the defendant to exhibit the tattoos to the jury without being subject to cross-examination. *Scarola, supra.*

In contrast, voice exemplar evidence is relatively easy to feign. An accent can be exaggerated or muted through a person's conscious efforts, such as avoiding particular words that one cannot pronounce without an accent. Since Newman made no offer to establish the genuineness of the exemplar, it would have been properly excluded as irrelevant. That is to say, in the words of the State's objection, the conditions under which Newman spoke to the victim could not be reproduced.

(c) Resolution

Thus, the second assignment of error also fails.

3. Sufficiency of Evidence

In the third and final assignment of error, Newman claims the district court mistakenly concluded that the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction.

(a) Scope of Review

Regardless of whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial, or a combination thereof, an appellate court, in reviewing a criminal conviction, does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such matters are for the finder of fact; a conviction will be affirmed in the absence of prejudicial error if the properly admitted evidence, viewed and construed most favorably to the State, is sufficient to support the conviction. *State v. Cody*, 248 Neb. 683, 539 N.W.2d 18 (1995); *State v. Pierce*, 248 Neb. 536, 537 N.W.2d 323 (1995). See, also, *State v. One 1985 Mercedes 190D Automobile*, 247 Neb. 335, 526 N.W.2d 657 (1995).

(b) Application of Law to Facts

At the time in question, § 28-319(1) provided, in relevant part, that one "who subjects another person to sexual penetration and (a) overcomes the victim by force, threat of force, express or implied, coercion . . . is guilty of sexual assault in the first degree." Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-318 (Reissue 1989) defined "sexual penetration" as including not only "sexual intercourse in its ordinary meaning," but "any intrusion, however slight, of any part of the actor's . . . body . . . into the genital . . . openings of the victim's body. . . . Sexual penetration shall not require emission of semen. . . . "

Thus, the State had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time and place in question, Newman overcame the victim by force, or the express or

implied threat thereof, and that he sexually penetrated her, no matter how slightly. *See, State v. Hirsch*, 245 Neb. 31, 511 N.W.2d 69 (1994); *State v. Dondlinger*, 222 Neb. 741, 386 N.W.2d 866 (1986).

We have previously determined that except for the harmless erroneous admission of Newman's black leather jacket, the district court made proper evidential rulings. The properly admitted evidence detailed previously, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, amply supports findings that at the time and place in question, Newman overcame the victim by force and that he sexually penetrated her, if in no other way, by inserting one of his fingers into her vagina.

(c) Resolution

Accordingly, the third and last assignment of error fails as well.

IV. JUDGMENT

As first noted in part I, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

JOHN BYRON NEWMAN, Petitioner, vs FRANK X. HOPKINS, Respondent.	)	4:96CV3287 **REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION** (Filed March 26, 1998)

The Amended Petition for habeas corpus relief raises five claims in challenging John Newman's 1994 conviction, in the Lancaster County Nebraska District Court, of first degree sexual assault. Petitioner's first trial ended in a mistrial when the jury was unable to agree on a verdict. His second trial resulted in a conviction. He was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 25-50 years.

On direct appeal to the Nebraska Court of Appeals, the conviction and sentence were affirmed. *State v. Newman*, 4 Neb.App. 265 (1995). Petitioner then petitioned the Nebraska Supreme Court for further review, which was granted. That court also affirmed the conviction and sentence. *State v. Newman*, 250 Neb. 226 (1996). He then filed his petition in this court, raising the same claims he raised to the Nebraska appellate courts. Counsel agree that there is no issue of procedural default or exhaustion of state remedies.

The facts as found in the state courts are recited by the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in this case and need not be repeated here.

Petitioner raises these claims:

> Claim 1. Petitioner's conviction was the result of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
>
> Claim 2. Petitioner was denied due process of law by the trial court's refusal to allow him to demonstrate his speaking voice, without waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege of silence and subjecting him to cross examination.
>
> Claim 3. Petitioner was denied due process of law when the trial court overruled his objections to testimony by witnesses Russell Grady and Julie Denny.
>
> Claim 4. Petitioner was denied due process of law when the trial court overruled his objections to the identification testimony of the victim, the fruit of an unduly suggestive photo array.
>
> Claim 5. Petitioner was denied due process of law in that insufficient evidence supported the verdict.

Amended Petition, filing 10. These claims must be reviewed under the new standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).[1]

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[1] "An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim –

> (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

Claim 1

Petitioner's Fourth Amendment claim is not an adequate claim for relief in habeas corpus. The Supreme Court in *Stone v. Powell,* 428 U.S. 465 (1976) barred habeas courts from considering Fourth Amendment claims when the state courts have provided the petitioner a full and fair opportunity to litigate such claims. Although the Eighth Circuit previously permitted a review of whether the state courts' hearings on such claims were in fact full and fair and resulted in factual findings supported by the record, that position was later changed. *Willett v. Lockhart* 37F.3d 1265 (8th Cir. 1994):

> We conclude that under *Stone* a federal habeas court considering a state prisoner's claim alleging a Fourth Amendment violation should abstain from reviewing the state court records to determine if the state's factual findings are fairly supported by the record as a whole, and we overrule *Howard v. Pung* [862 F.2d 1348 (8th Cir. 1988)] to the extent that it requires otherwise. Rather, the proper inquiry is whether "the State has provided an *opportunity* for full and fair litigation" of the claim. *Stone,* 428 U.S. at 482, 494, 96 S.Ct. at 3046, 3052.

> (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This provision, part of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, became effective April 24, 1996. This case was filed July 30, 1996. No argument is made that the 1996 amendments do not govern this case.

37 F.3d at 1270 (emphasis added). Further,

> The *Stone* bar applies despite a state court's error in deciding the merits of a defendant's fourth amendment claim.

Robinson v. Clarke, 939 F.2d 573, 575 (8th Cir. 1991); quoting *Lenza v. Wyrick*, 665 F.2d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 1981).

The record in this case is clear that petitioner was afforded, and took, a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim in the state courts. Thus, to the extent that petitioner is requesting this court to review the state courts' conclusions regarding the substance of his Fourth Amendment claim, this court is barred by *Stone* from doing so.

However, petitioner also argues that the state appellate courts misapplied the harmless error doctrine after finding a Fourth Amendment violation, and relies upon *Brecht v. Abrahamson*, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) for the proposition that an evidentiary hearing and particularized findings are necessary to determine whether the state met its burden of showing harmlessness. Respondent argues that the first of petitioner's claims is barred by *Stone v. Powell* in its entirety.

The Eighth Circuit has not directly addressed the issue of whether habeas review of a state court's conclusion that a Fourth Amendment violation was harmless error is barred by *Stone v. Powell*. Neither petitioner nor respondent has briefed this issue.

The Third Circuit, in *Gilmore v. Marks*, 799 F.2d 51 (3rd Cir. 1986), *cert. denied*, 479 U.S. 1041 (1987), thoroughly addressed this issue and concluded that the state

court's finding of harmlessness was a part of the "full and fair" opportunity to litigate the underlying Fourth Amendment claim, and was thus barred by *Stone*. The court noted that in the two cases before the Supreme Court in *Stone*, one of them (Powell) involved a state court's finding that any Fourth Amendment violation was harmless, and the other (Rice) involved a decision that the state court's ruling on the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim was incorrect. The Supreme Court did not distinguish between the two in its discussion of the deference to be accorded state courts' ruling on Fourth Amendment claims, leading the Third Circuit to conclude, "That the state appellate court in *Powell* had found the error, if any, to be harmless was, therefore, irrelevant to the Court's decision." 799 F.2d at 56. *Accord, see, Agee v. White*, 809 F.2d 1487, 1490 (11th Cir. 1987) (State court's finding of harmlessness was part of "full and fair" opportunity to litigate Fourth Amendment claim and therefore *Stone*-barred); *McDaniel v. Oklahoma*, 582 F.2d 1242, 1244 (10th Cir. 1978), *cert. denied*, 439 U.S. 969 (1978) (same).

In *Stone*, the Court found that Fourth Amendment claims were not cognizable in habeas proceedings, because the exclusionary rule was not a constitutional rule, but rather a judge-created rule of deterrence meant to prevent law enforcement officers from violating the amendment. Weighing the social costs of overturning state convictions based upon a non-constitutional doctrine, the Court concluded that where a state had provided a full and fair opportunity to a defendant to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim, the federal courts were powerless to intervene, even if they might disagree. Later, in explaining *Stone*, Justice Powell wrote:

> As many of our cases indicate, the admission of illegally seized but reliable evidence does not lead to an unjust or fundamentally unfair verdict. We have held repeatedly that such evidence ordinarily is excluded only for deterrence reasons that have no relation to the fairness of the defendant's trial. *United States v. Leon*, 468 U.S. 897, 906, (1984); *Stone v. Powell*, 428 U.S., at 486-488; *United States v. Calandra*, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). Indeed, it has long been clear that exclusion of illegally seized but wholly reliable evidence renders verdicts less fair and just, because it "deflects the truthfinding process and often frees the guilty." *Stone v. Powell*, 428 U.S., at 490. *See also id.*, at 540 (WHITE, J., dissenting) (noting that often "the only consequence" of exclusion "is that unimpeachable and probative evidence is kept from the trier of fact and the truth-finding function of proceedings is substantially impaired or a trial totally aborted"). Thus, the harm suffered by respondent in this case is not the denial of a fair and reliable adjudication of his guilt, but rather the absence of a windfall.

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 395-5 (1986) (Powell, J., Concurring).

I am confident that given this background, the Eighth Circuit would join the other circuits that have addressed the issue and conclude that *Stone* bars the habeas court from considering the state appellate courts's findings of harmlessness of a Fourth Amendment violation. Consequently, I conclude that petitioner's first claim is barred in its entirety.

Claim 2

Petitioner argues that the state courts misapplied federal law in holding that his proposed voice exemplar would waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination and would subject him to cross examination, and also that the trial court's ruling was not prejudicial. In addressing this issue the Nebraska Supreme Court held, "We conclude that if relevant and reliable, a voice exemplar may be offered into evidence by a criminal defendant without waiving his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination." *State v. Newman*, 250 Neb. at 244. The court went on, however, to hold that even though the trial court had erred in excluding the voice exemplar, the ruling was not prejudicial because, under the test the court established, the petitioner had failed to demonstrate that the exemplar would meet the "relevant and reliable" test. *Id.*, at 245.[2] Petitioner seems to argue that the state supreme court's application of this rule to him was an unreasonable application of federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). I disagree.

The application of a state's evidence rules to a habeas petitioner has long been viewed by the federal courts as largely unreviewable in habeas corpus actions. *See*, e.g.,

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[2] Although the court used the term "irrelevant" in its conclusion, it had previously found that the evidence would have been relevant to the issue of identity. *Id.*, at 244. Its conclusion follows a discussion that an exemplar may be "relatively easy to feign," but is also explained that "the conditions under which petitioner spoke to the victim could not be reproduced." *Id.* at 245. In any event, it is clear that the court faulted the petitioner for failing to meet the "relevant and reliable" standard it established in this case.

Redding v. Minnesota, 881 F.2d 575, 578 (8th Cir. 1989), *cert. denied*, 493 U.S. 1089 (1990):

> In a habeas corpus proceeding state evidentiary matters are reviewable only if "the asserted error infringed a specific constitutional protection or was so prejudicial as to deny due process." *Wallace v. Lockhart*, 701 F.2d 719, 724 (8th Cir.) *cert. denied*, 464 U.S. 934 (1983). A denial of due process occurs when the error is "gross, conspicuously prejudicial or of such import that the trial was fatally infected." *Rhodes v. Foster*, 682 F.2d 711, 714 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing *Maggitt v. Wyrick*, 533 F.2d 383, 385 (8th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 429 U.S. 898 (1976)). It follows that this due process standard requires a greater showing of prejudice than needed to support a finding of plain error on direct appeal. *Daniels v. Wood*, 819 F.2d 195, 197 (8th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 484 U.S. 861 (1987).

881 F.2d at 579. A habeas court may examine such alleged errors only if they are so egregious as to have "fatally infected the trial and rendered it fundamentally unfair." *Meadows v. Delo*, 99 F.3d 280, 283 (8th Cir. 1996), quoting *Troupe v. Groose*, 72 F.3d 75, 76 (8th Cir. 1995).

The Nebraska Supreme Court is the final arbiter of state law, including the Nebraska rules of evidence. Neither the rule as pronounced, nor the application of it to this petitioner, has been shown by him to meet the test above described. In fact, as that court stated, there was other identification evidence before the jury which clearly pointed to the petitioner; the use of his voice exemplar in addition to the "accent/no-accent" conflict among the

other witnesses would not likely have changed the outcome of the trial in any respect. Its exclusion certainly did not render the trial "fundamentally unfair." This claim is without merit.

Claim 3

The previous discussion regarding evidentiary rulings is applicable to this claim. Petitioner has argued that the use of the Nebraska evidence rules at issue, *Neb. Rev. Stat.* § 27-404(2) and § 27-403, were misapplied by the trial court in admitting the testimony of Russell Grady and Julie Denny. Section 27-404(2), itself, however, permits the use of such testimony as "proof of motive, *opportunity*, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, *identity*, or absence of mistake or accident." (Emphasis added). Although the petitioner argues otherwise, it is clear that the evidence was relevant to both the perpetrator's identity[3] and his opportunity to commit the charged offense.

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[3] Although petitioner argues that his identity was never at issue in the trial, the Eighth Circuit has repeatedly held that a plea of not guilty to a criminal charge automatically places all issues related to the prosecution's burden of proof, including identity, at issue. *See*, e.g., *U.S. v. Miller*, 974 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1992):

> As we explained in *United States v. Gilmore*, 730 F.2d 550, 554 (8th Cir. 1984):
>
> > By pleading not guilty, the defendant put the government to its proof on all elements of the charged crime, including intent, knowledge, and identity. The challenged testimony supports the government's position on each of these issues. The government is not required to wait until a defendant posits a particular defense asserting the lack of one of the

Petitioner has not shown that its admission rendered the trial "fundamentally unfair" so as to qualify for habeas relief on this ground.

Claim 4

Petitioner's challenge to the victim's identification testimony raises Fourteenth Amendment issues. Petitioner claims that the photo array from which the victim identified his picture was unduly suggestive, and that the suggestiveness led to the victim's erroneous identification of him in court, denying him due process.

In reviewing whether a photo array was unduly suggestive, the court must determine, from the totality of the circumstances of the procedures used and the photos themselves, whether there was created a "very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification," *Simmons v. United States*, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), such that the procedure was fundamentally unfair to the defendant. *Manson v. Braithwaite*, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); *Dodd v. Nix*, 48 F.3d 1071 (8th Cir. 1995); *Harris v. Wyrick*, 644 F.2d 710, 712 (8th Cir. 1981). If so, then the court must also decide whether, in fact, the identification testimony at trial was reliable, in spite of the unduly suggestive identification

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elements of the charged crime, but may prove up their case in anticipation of such a defense. *See, also, Estelle v. McGuire*, 502 U.S. 62, 69-70 (1991) ("[T]he prosecution's burden to prove every element of the crime is not relieved by a defendant's tactical decision not to contest an essential element of the offense").

974 F.2d at 960.

procedures. *Neil v. Biggers*, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); *Graham v. Solem*, 728 F.2d 1533, 1541 (8th Cir. 1984), considering

> the witness's opportunity to view the defendant at the time of the crime, the witness's degree of attention at the time of the crime, the accuracy of the witness's description prior to the identification, the level of certainty expressed by the witness when making the identification, and the length of time that has elapsed between the crime and the confrontation.

409 U.S. at 199-200.

The Nebraska Supreme Court found that the procedures used in this case regarding the photo array were not, in fact, unduly suggestive. 250 Neb. at 226-7. Although the petitioner disagrees, he has not shown that that court's conclusion was either "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Nebraska Supreme Court's conclusion is fully supported by the record of the case and clearly follows established Supreme Court precedent.[4] I conclude, therefore, that this claim, too, is without merit.

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[4] The Nebraska Supreme Court relied upon *State v. Gibbs*, 238 Neb 268 (1991) and *State v. Price*, 229 Neb. 448 (1988), both of which applied the *Braithwaite* and *Biggers* analysis, albeit without citing to those cases. In those cases the Nebraska Supreme Court relied upon *State v. Swoopes*, 223 Neb. 914 (1986), overruled on other grounds, *State v. Jackson*, 225 Neb. 843 (1987), as authority for its standards in reviewing claims of unduly

Claim 5

Petitioner challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting conviction. Applying the familiar test of *Jackson v. Virginia*, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), it is clear from the record that the evidence was more than sufficient to support a guilty verdict by "any rational trier of fact." 443 U.S. at 319. The Nebraska Supreme Court's consideration of the issue is clearly within the parameters of the precedents of the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This claim is likewise without merit.

IT THEREFORE HEREBY IS RECOMMENDED to the Hon. Warren K. Urbom, United States Senior District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), that the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied in all respects.

The parties are notified that failure to file an objection to this recommendation in accordance with the local rules of this court may be held to be a waiver of any right to appeal the district judge's adoption of this recommendation.

Dated March 25, 1998

BY THE COURT:

/s/ David L. Piester
United States Magistrate Judge

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suggestive identification techniques. *Swoopes*, in turn, relied upon *Simmons v. United States*, *supra*.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

JOHN BYRON NEWMAN, Plaintiff,	) 4:96CV3287
vs.	) MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON AMENDED
FRANK X. HOPKINS, Defendant.	) PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
	) (Filed Apr. 27, 1998)

On March 26, 1998, there was filed a Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge David L. Piester that the petitioner's Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied in all respects. Filing 21. Objection to that report and recommendation was made by the petitioner on April 9, 1998. The respondent moved to strike the petitioner's objection. The petitioner moved to strike the respondent's motion to strike. The respondent then moved to strike the petitioner's motion to strike. The petitioner filed a second motion to strike the respondent's motion to strike.

I must move quickly to resolve these motions, lest the giddiness of this merry-go-round becomes an addiction.

The report and recommendation of the magistrate judge was filed and copies mailed to counsel on March 26, 1998. The objection to the report and recommendation was filed and served by mail on April 9, 1998, the fourteenth day after March 26. The question is whether the objection was timely made. That depends upon the interrelatedness of three sets of rules: the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases

in the United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), and the Local Rules of this court (NELR).

Because this is a case filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, it seems sensible to begin with the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. They became effective February 1, 1977. Rule 8 of those rules allows a magistrate judge to be designated to submit recommendations for disposition and says that any party may serve and file written objections to the recommendations "[w]ithin ten days after being served with a copy." Title 28, U.S.C. § 636, having to do with a magistrate judge's procedures, uses the same language. No other provision of those rules or of § 636 explains how to calculate the ten-day period. The ten-day limit could be expanded beyond ten days if Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were to apply to § 2254 cases, because that rule does explain how to compute time, by not including the first day, including the last day unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday or when the court is inaccessible for the filing, and excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays if the time prescribed is less than eleven days, and adding three days after service by mail. Whether any of the features of Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can be employed in the computation of times for § 2254 cases is therefore critical in this case.

The only rule of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts that suggests when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable is Rule 11, which says:

> "The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent that they are not inconsistent with these rules, may be applied, when appropriate, to, petitions filed under these rules."

Rule 81(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure says:

> "These rules are applicable to . . . habeas corpus . . . to the extent that the practice in such proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the United States and has heretofore conformed to the practice in civil actions. . . . "

In *Harris v. Nelson*, 394 U.S. 286 (1969), the court observed that, while habeas corpus proceedings are characterized as "civil," such a label is "gross and inexact." *Id.* at 293-94. "Essentially," the court said, a habeas corpus proceedings is "unique." *Id.* at 294. In deciding that the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were not intended by the drafters to be extended to habeas corpus as a matter of right, the Court said:

> "In considering the intended application of the new rules to habeas corpus, it is illuminating to note that in 1938 the expansion of federal habeas corpus to its present scope was only in its early stages. . . . In these circumstances it is readily understandable that, as indicated by the language and the scanty contemporary exegesis of Rule 81(a)(2) which is available, the draftsmen of the rule did not contemplate that the discovery provisions of the rules would be applicable to habeas corpus proceedings."

Id. at 295.

One of the particular reasons the Supreme Court used in deciding that the discovery rules were not applicable to habeas corpus proceedings was that their specific provisions were "ill-suited to the special problems and character" of habeas corpus proceedings. That, however, does not appear to be true with respect to the matter of computation of time. No guidance for computing time is suggested in the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, other than its reference to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "to the extent that they are not inconsistent with these rules . . . [and] when appropriate." It appears to me that Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not inconsistent with the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in United States District Courts and that it is appropriate to apply that rule to habeas corpus cases, given the absence of guidance otherwise in computing time limits.

In *Harris v. Nelson, supra,* the court in footnote 7, said:

> "In fact, it is our view that the rule-making machinery [of district courts] should be invoked to formulate rules of practice with respect to federal habeas corpus and § 2255 proceedings, on a comprehensive basis and not merely one confined to discovery. The problems presented by these proceedings are materially different from those dealt with in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and reliance upon usage and the opaque language of Civil Rule 81(a)(2) is transparently inadequate. In our view the results of a meticulous formulation and adoption of special rules for federal habeas corpus and § 2255 proceedings would promise much benefit."

Consistent with the footnote in the *Harris* case, this court has adopted its local rules. NELR 72.4 provides:

> "A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate judge in a dispositive matter (i.e., excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (2)) by filing a 'Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge's Recommendation' within ten days after being served with a copy of the recommendation, unless a different time is established by order."

That local rule is not particularly helpful, because it, too, gives no guidance in how to compute the ten days or whether to exclude certain days or add days for mailing. My sense is that practicing lawyers have, by and large, assumed that Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applies to habeas corpus cases.

Accordingly, because the history of the intent of the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is scanty and murky, because habeas corpus proceedings have generally been characterized as civil in nature, because to apply Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to § 2254 cases would not be inconsistent with the rules specifically designed for those cases, I find that it is appropriate to apply Rule 6 to this case.

Supportive of this result is *Smith v. Housewright*, 66 F.2d 689, 694 (8th Cir. 1981).

It follows that, upon excluding Saturdays and Sundays, the objection to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation was timely filed on the tenth day after the filing and service of the report and recommendation.

None of the motions to strike will be granted. When I deny the first motion to strike, the other motions to strike have (and never have had) any purpose.

That brings us to the substance of the objection to the report and recommendation. The analysis by the magistrate judge of *Stone v. Powell* regarding the Fourth Amendment, the proposed voice exemplar and the Fifth Amendment, the admission of evidence of other crimes and acts, the photo array and the sufficiency of the evidence is on target. The recommendation of the magistrate judge will be adopted.

IT IS ORDERED that:

1. the Motion to Strike Objections of Petitioner to Magistrate's Report and Recommendation, filing 23, is denied;
2. the Motion to Strike Respondent's Motion to Strike, filing 24, is denied;
3. the Motion of Respondent to Strike Petitioner's Motion to Strike Objections of Petitioner to Magistrate's Report and Recommendation, filing 25, is denied;
4. the Second Motion to Strike Respondent's Motion to Strike, filing 26, is denied;
5. the Report and Recommendation of the magistrate judge, filing 21, is adopted; and
6. the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filing 10, is denied.

Dated April 24, 1998.

BY THE COURT

/s/ Warren K. Urbom
United States Senior District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

JOHN BYRON NEWMAN, Plaintiff,	)	4:96CV3287
vs.	)	JUDGMENT
FRANK X. HOPKINS, Defendant.	)	(Filed Apr. 27, 1998)

In accordance with the Memorandum and Order on Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus,

IT IS ORDERED that judgment is entered for the respondent.

Dated April 24, 1998.

BY THE COURT

/s/ Warren K. Urbom
United States Senior District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA

JOHN BYRON NEWMAN, Plaintiff, vs. FRANK X. HOPKINS, Defendant.	)	4:96CV3287 ORDER ON MOTION FOR CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY (Filed May 29, 1998)

Upon review of my Memorandum and Order on Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus, filing 27, and the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge David L. Piester, dated March 25, 1998, filing 21, I find that the applicant has not made a substantial showing of a denial of any constitutional right. Accordingly, in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) a certificate of appealability shall not be issued unless done by a circuit justice.

Dated May 28, 1998.

BY THE COURT

/s/ Warren K. Urbom
United States Senior District Judge

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

98-2445

John Byron Newman, Appellant,	*	
v.	*	Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska
Frank X. Hopkins, Appellee.	*	

The application for certificate of appealability is granted with respect to the following two issues: (1) whether the admission at petitioner's trial of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment was harmless error; and (2) whether the refusal to allow petitioner to offer into evidence an exemplar of his own voice was a denial of any right under the Constitution of the United States.

In all other respects, the application for certificate of appealability is denied.

September 9, 1998

Order entered at the direction of the Court:

/s/ Michael Gans

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-2445NEL

John Byron Newman, Appellant,	*	
vs.	*	Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska
Frank X. Hopkins, Appellee.	*	

Appellee's motion to recall the mandate has been considered by the court and is granted pending the filing of a petition for writ of certiorari.

(5231-010199)

December 17, 1999

Order entered at the direction of the Court:

/s/ Michael E. Gans

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-2445NEL

John Byron Newman,	*	
	*	
Appellant,	*	Order Denying Petition
	*	for Rehearing and for
vs.	*	Rehearing En Banc
	*	
Frank X. Hopkins,	*	
	*	
Appellee.	*	

The petition for rehearing en banc is denied. Judge Bowman and Judge Loken would grant the petition. Judge Beam would grant the petition limited to the standard for harmless error review in federal habeas proceedings. The petition for rehearing by the panel is also denied.

(5128-010199)

November 22, 1999

Order entered at the direction of the Court:

/s/ Michael E. Gans

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit

No. 01-803

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FRANK X. HOPKINS,
Warden of the
Nebraska State Penitentiary,
Petitioner,

vs.

JOHN BYRON NEWMAN,Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Submitted by:
JOHN BYRON NEWMAN, Respondent,

JOHN C. VANDERSLICE
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I. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE LOWER COURTS' ADJUDICATION OF NEWMAN'S FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM RESULTED IN A DECISION THAT INVOLVED AN UNREASONABLE APPLICATION OF CLEARLY ESTABLISHED FEDERAL LAW AS DETERMINED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

The Petitioner mischaracterizes the Circuit Court's analysis regarding how the state courts created a *per se* ban on Newman offering his voice exemplar at trial. An examination of what occurred at trial, when Newman wanted to read a statement to the jury so that they could hear the sound of his voice, must be undertaken (1) to properly understand the context in which Newman made the offer, (2) to properly understand how the trial court's erroneous ruling effectively foreclosed Newman from offering any evidence regarding the sound of his voice, and (3) to place the issue into proper constitutional context.

There can be no real dispute that the credibility of the victim's identification of Newman as her attacker was the primary disputed issue at both of Newman's jury trials. In this regard, the inability of Newman's first jury to reach a unanimous verdict highlights how every identifying characteristic, including whether Newman possesses a Hispanic or Mexican accent, was vital to his defense. Noteworthy is that testimony was adduced from several prosecution trial witnesses regarding whether Newman possessed a Mexican or Hispanic accent. Trial transcript at 192, 224, 247, 391-92, 496-98, 706, 739, and 751. Thus, the relevance of Newman's voice exemplar offer can not be disputed.

When the state rested and Newman's opportunity for presenting evidence arose, he opted only to give a voice exemplar to show that he had no Mexican or Hispanic accent. A close examination of the trial record regarding the proposed voice exemplar is necessary to give proper consideration to the petition for writ of certiorari. The trial record states as follows:

> THE COURT: The motion [for directed verdict of acquittal] is overruled. At this time there are several matters that we should take up. First of all, I would like to advise the defendant that he has a right against self-incrimination, which means that he is not required to testify, and he can not be made to testify during the course of this trial. You have a right as well to testify. In other words, you can testify under oath and testify like any other witness, but then you would be subject to cross-examination. The exercise of one right necessarily waives the other right, do you understand?
>
> THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
>
> MR. VANDERSLICE: Judge, in that regard, I would like to move the Court to permit Mr. Newman to give a voice exemplar to the jury. Now, I think the case law indicates that a person can give a voice exemplar, meaning just the sound of one's voice, without waiving any privilege against self-incrimination because it's not testimonial in nature. I think - - what I would propose, Judge, is that we have Mr.

Newman stand when we call back the jury and say something that's fairly innocuous like Deputy Stebbing testified to, "My name is John Newman. I had asked for an attorney when I was coming back with Mr. Stebbing. The weather was nice," something to that effect, so that the jury can hear Mr. Newman's voice. I don't think that he waives his privilege against self-incrimination by giving such an exemplar. It would be very similar to, for example, giving a blood sample or pubic hair, et cetera. I think that the jury does - - Mr. Newman does have a right to have the jury hear his voice, and I would ask the Court for leave to do so.

MS. NELSON: The State would object to that. I think that [the victim] has testified to certain phrases and words that he has said and unless those phrases are also included, the State would certainly object to that in terms of reproducing those conditions. I don't think that that would be at all indicative of those conditions, and I don't think that those are the types of conditions that are reproducable.

MR. VANDERSLICE: Judge, we're talking about people who have also testified about the sound of his voice, a Hispanic accent. I think we should permit the jury to hear that and make a decision for themselves as to what the sound of his voice appears to be to them.

THE COURT: Well, I know that, for example, the State's last witness [Deputy Stebbing] - - Obviously, you were not eliciting what the defendant said as testimony, you were introducing that to show the sound of his voice, otherwise we would have had other problems that we would have had to deal with before it would have been admissable.

MS. NELSON: I certainly was not asking him to tell us anything about what the defendant said, that's true.

THE COURT: That's true.

MR. VANDERSLICE: No, but you asked him what - - did he have an accent, or what did his voice sound like, in essence.

MS. NELSON: No, I think I said if he detected anything himself. His own opinion. I asked him his opinion. I didn't ask him - - I asked him his opinion as to whether there were any speech impediments or anything that he noticed.

MR. VANDERSLICE: And he said yes and proceeded to tell what his opinion - -

MS. NELSON: That he noticed. The evidence is their opinion.

THE COURT: Okay. Well - -

MR. VANDERSLICE: Judge, if permitted to do so, I would object to having something said like Ms. Smith, "I'm going to bash your F-ing head in," or - - I think that if the statements are made to the jury, they

should be somewhat innocuous, just so they can hear the sound of his voice.

THE COURT: Well, I'll reserve ruling until we get back, but I would like to see the authority that you have that tells me this isn't testimony. In other words - -

MR. VANDERSLICE: Well, from the top of my head, I think there's a case called Schmerber, which is the United States Constitutional opinion that basically says things like voice exemplars - -

* * * *

THE COURT: All right. Excepting from my comments the words of your counsel, in other words, keeping that as a separate issue, the voice exemplar, have you decided whether you can to testify or not?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I have.

THE COURT: What have you decided?

THE DEFENDANT: I decline to testify.

* * * *

THE COURT: Let the record reflect that we are outside the presence of the jury, that counsel for the defendant and counsel for the State are meeting in chambers with me. Counsel for the defendant, who is about to start his case in chief has indicated that he wants to put on the defendant for purposes of giving his voice exemplar without any

testimony as such. Is that - Well, rather than me state your position, why don't you state your position?

MR. VANDERSLICE: Yes, Judge, basically that is my position. I don't believe that there is a privilege against self-incrimination issue here because of the United States versus Wade case which basically holds that the sound of one's voice is not testimony under the Fifth Amendment. It is our position that Mr. Newman should be able to read an innocuous statement, meaning a statement that is fairly neutral, "My name is John Newman. I was born on - -" such and such a date, words to those effect before the jury so that they can determine whether or not he has a Hispanic accent. I would submit that he can just read from that statement and he doesn't need to be sworn in. Basically, then the jury can decide whether or not he does have a Hispanic accent. I don't think there is a privilege of self-incrimination issue here, and I think that the jury is entitled to hear that evidence.

THE COURT: What's the State's position?

MS. NELSON: The State objects, Judge. Specifically, the Wade case is a case that is not on point as we sit here today in terms of the defendant standing up and speaking directly to the jury. The Wade case talks about whether identifications of other witnesses that testified at a trial ought to be able to give those identifications that they made

from a line-up prior to trial where the defendant in the Wade case was asked to speak at the line-up and then they made identification based on that speech at that time. It's different, because it's a pretrial line-up identification by witnesses, not something talking about a defendant speaking to a jury non-testimonially, and that's not at all what the Wade case talks about and says.

THE COURT: The objection is sustained.

MR. VANDERSLICE: Judge, I would like to note for the record that I would like to make a due process argument related to not permitting Mr. Newman to make that kind of a statement in front of the jury.

THE COURT: Very well.

MR. VANDERSLICE: It violates his right to due process and to present evidence that should be presented to the jury.

THE COURT: So there is no mistake about the ruling, the defendant is entitled to testify in any voice that he wants to, however, I will sustain the objection to his testimony other than under oath and to be given the full scope of cross-examination.

Trial transcript at 756-62.

Having reviewed what actually occurred in the trial court now permits Petitioner's argument to be examined in the proper context.

The primary thrust of Petitioner's first argument is that presenting evidence of a Hispanic accent is "...a matter of state evidentiary law, pure and simple." Petition at p.15. Thus, because the "...matter simply is not one of either constitutional magnitude or susceptible of constitutional interpretation[,]" Petitioner posits that *Estelle v. McGuire*, 502 U.S. 62, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed. 385 (1991) mandates that Newman's claim for habeas relief is improper. Several facets of Petitioner's argument, however, are wrong.

There is no question but that Newman's constitutional rights to present a defense and to exercise his privilege against self incrimination are involved when the trial court erroneously ruled that Newman had to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege by giving a voice exemplar to the jury. Such an erroneous ruling obviously had far reaching constitutional ramifications that have been discussed by all appellate courts addressing the issue. Petitioner even acknowledges this constitutional error. Petition at 16. Thus, Petitioner's attempt to relegate this claim to a mere evidentiary ruling is easily dismissed.

Petitioner's attempt to twist the meaning of *Estelle v. McGuire*, 502 U.S. 62, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed. 385 (1991) to the facts of this case is equally unavailing. While the holding of *Estelle* (*i.e.*, that federal habeas relief does not lie for errors of state law) is not disputed, the application of *Estelle* to this case is.

Estelle involved a situation where petitioner claimed that the admission of battered child evidence at his homicide trial violated due process. This Court noted

that "...the Court of Appeals relied in part on its conclusion that the evidence was 'incorrectly admitted...pursuant to California law.'" *Estelle* at 67. In contrast, Newman's case never actually involved the application of Nebraska evidentiary or procedural rules to whether Newman could offer to the jury the sound of his voice. Instead, the trial court focused solely upon whether Newman must waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination by offering his voice sample to the jury. In fact, as the above trial excerpt clearly indicates, Newman's counsel provided supporting constitutional precedent to the trial court [illegible] *States v. Wade*, 388 U.S.218, 87 S.Ct. [illegible] *Schmerber v. California*, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. [illegible] support of the principle that Newman should be able to let the jury hear the sound of his voice without waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege. Accordingly, Petitioner's claim that no constitutional interpretation was ever involved is simply incorrect. To the contrary, as the above trial excerpt also clearly shows, relevance, reliability, and admissibility of Newman's voice sample was never disputed at the trial level. Only waiving his testimonial privilege by giving a voice exemplar and only his due process right to present evidence were discussed. The [illegible] to apply *Estelle* to this case is misplaced.

One of Petitioner's primary argum[illegible] that the trial court's erroneous ruling and [illegible] sions created a *per se* ban on offering [illegible]

Here, it must be noted that for Newman, the erroneous trial court ruling essentially foreclosed him from offering ANY evidence, even regarding the admissibility and reliability of the sound of his voice, because he was not going to give testimony and be subject to cross examination under any circumstances. In other words, Newman was not going to risk being compelled to "testify" subject to cross examination by saying one word to the jury. In effect, the trial court's error placed Newman into the Hobson's choice of waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege in a situation where such waiver was not constitutionally mandated. Under such circumstances, the state

Supreme Court's characterization of the issue as an "Other Evidentiary Ruling" must also be addressed. As stated, the trial court made no inquiry regarding the admissibility of Newman's voice sample. The admissibility question was only raised by the appellate courts. As far as the trial court was concerned, Newman's voice sample was admissible as long as he waived his privilege. Thus, again, recognition must be given to the proper context in which the voice sample was originally raised.

Estelle, must be decided in Newman's favor. Contrary to the Petitioner's view, state law evidentiary admissibility was never an issue at the trial court level, but constitutional considerations have always been implicated by the voice sample issue. Such was recognized by the Circuit Court when it correctly analyzed this issue. *See*, Petitioner s Appendix at App. 4-8. Accordingly, Petitioner's characterization of the voice exemplar issue as a state law evidentiary question covered by *Estelle* is disingenuous and wrong.

Petitioner also argues, somewhat parenthetically at the end of its first

complains that there is no "clearly established federal law" related to offering voice exemplars at trial such that a reviewing habeas court could properly analyze whether constitutional principles were wrongly applied below. Petitioner's Brief at 17-18.

In short, Petitioner's analysis is incorrect. Respondent would simply refer this Court to the reasoning provided by the Circuit Court on this point. See, Petitioner's Appendix at App. 15-App. 20. The Circuit Court correctly applied *Williams v. Taylor*

II. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT'S HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS COMPLIES WITH *CHAPMAN V. CALIFORNIA* AND *BRECHT V. ABRAHAMSON.*

The Eighth Circuit's policy of applying *Chapman v. California*, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), to constitutional violations which have not received a harmless error analysis in the state courts is entirely consistent with Supreme Court precedent and with the purposes behind habeas review.

Petitioner contends that this Court has developed two harmless error standards for non-structural trial errors: the *Chapman* standard for cases on direct [illegible] set forth in *Brecht v. Abrahamson*, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), for [illegible] fact, however, Respondent suggests that this Court's [illegible] different lines. As the Eighth Circuit aptly explained in *Orndorff v. Lockhart*, 998 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1993), the question of whether *Brecht* or *Chapman* applies depends upon whether the constitutional error received a *Chapman* harmless error review before the case reached the federal courts on a habeas petition. The genesis for this dichotomy can be found in *Brecht* itself.

In *Brecht*, the petitioner claimed that the state's references during trial to his post-*Miranda* silence violated his right to due process. The state courts had agreed that Brecht's rights had been violated. However, Brecht was denied relief when the [illegible] determined, in accordance with *Chapman*, that the error [illegible] reasonable doubt." 507 U.S. at 626. Thereafter, Brecht [illegible] 28 U.S.C. § 2254, reasserting his due process claim.

When his claim reached the Supreme Court, however, the sole issue for debate was whether the federal courts were obligated, as the state had been, to consider the effect of the due process violation under *Chapman*. *Id.* at 622-23.

This Court concluded that Brecht's case should be resolved with a view toward the principles underlying habeas relief. *Id.* at 632. The Court noted that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus ordinarily follows a direct appeal in the state courts. *Id.* at 633. Because of the thoroughness of that process, a presumption of finality and legality attaches to a petitioner's conviction and sentence after direct review. The writ of habeas corpus provides a limited avenue for overcoming that presumption, and is reserved for those petitioners who have been grievously wronged. *Id.* at 634. Absent such circumstances, a federal habeas court must respect the state court's good-faith efforts to honor constitutional rights. *Id.* at 634-35.

Consistent with these principles, this Court decided that Brecht was not entitled to yet another *Chapman* review in his case. Justice Rehnquist wrote, "it scarcely seems logical to require federal habeas courts to engage in the identical approach to harmless-error review that *Chapman* requires state courts to engage in on direct review." *Id.* at 636. Such a decision would result in duplication and undermine the States' interest in the finality of its decisions. Therefore, "[a]bsent affirmative evidence that state-court judges are ignoring their oath," a less onerous harmless error analysis is appropriate on habeas review. *Id.*

The Eighth Circuit's decision in *Orndorff* follows *Brecht*'s reasoning to its only logical conclusion. Because this Court's opinion in *Brecht* was based on respecting the finality and integrity of state court decisions, it follows that *Brecht* does not apply if the state court has never achieved finality on the question of harmless error. *Orndorff*, 998 F.2d at 1430. In such instances, *Orndorff* does nothing more than ensure that, at some point in the progression of the case, a constitutional error receives the harmless error review this Court in *Chapman* proscribed. *See, Chapman*, 386 U.S. 218, 24 (1967).

Despite this overriding logic, Petitioner insists that other circuits and this Court itself have all rejected the Eighth Circuit's holding in *Orndorff*. Moreover, according to Petitioner, "[t]his Court simply did not restrict the application of the standard enunciated in *Brecht* to cases in which a petitioner had already raised the issue to the state courts under *Chapman*." Petitioner's Brief at 21. None of Petitioner's arguments, however, warrant granting a writ of certiorari.

First, while the Eighth Circuit may be in the minority in applying *Chapman*, the other circuits' failure to analytically recognize the true meaning of *Brecht* is no reason for this Court to accept certiorari. Instead, this Court should consider granting certiorari when a case is presented from a circuit court which applied the incorrect review standard. Newman's is not such a case. Second, this Court itself has never issued a decision in conflict with *Orndorff*. Certainly, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed its holding in *Brecht*, both in *California v. Roy*, 519 U.S. 2 (1997), and

in *Calderon v. Coleman*, 529 U.S. 141 (1998). However, the constitutional errors in both of those cases had already received harmless error review in the state courts. *See, Roy*, 519 U.S. at 3; *People v. Coleman*, 46 Cal.3d 749, 781 (1988). This Court's precedent, therefore, does nothing to undermine the Eighth Circuit's approach to errors which have never received harmless error review in state proceedings.

As for Petitioner's contention that the Eighth Circuit's ruling in *Orndorff* has stripped *Brecht* of significance, Petitioner overstates *Orndorff's* impact. In reality, the role of *Brecht* has already been lessened with the passage of the Anti Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter "AEDPA"). Under the AEDPA, the federal courts do not perform their own harmless error analysis so much as review the reasonableness of a state court's harmless error calculus. *Nevers v. Killinger*, 169 F.3d 352 (6th Cir. 1999). Moreover, the stricter habeas standard recognized in *Orndorff* comes into play only when the state courts did not take the opportunity to review the error under *Chapman*. It has no effect at all in numerous other habeas cases. Finally, there are many instances in which the distinction between *Brecht* and *Chapman* does not even make a difference, either because the constitutional error is clearly harmless or clearly harmful under either standard.

Newman's case is a prime example of a case which required reversal under either *Brecht* or *Chapman*. As the Eighth Circuit's decisions recognize, Newman's was an extremely close case. The first trial on this offense, in which the prosecutor

introduced virtually the same evidence, ended in a mistrial when the jury could not reach a verdict. In such a case, almost any piece of evidence can tip the balance from innocence to guilt.

Nothing had more potential of influencing the jury than evidence bearing on the identity of the perpetrator of the crime. Because the main witnesses in the crime encountered the alleged attacker in the dark under circumstances particularly susceptible to unreliable identification,[1] each detail of identification was important. The question of whether Newman has a Hispanic accent was therefore crucial to determining whether he fit the description of the attacker. Under these circumstances, the panel was correct in concluding that the denial of Newman's right to present evidence on this point was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, because of the exculpatory value of Newman's lack of a Hispanic accent, the constitutional violation could not have helped but have a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." *Brecht*, 507 U.S. at 637 (quoting *Kotteakos v. United States*, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). Therefore, under either *Chapman* or *Brecht*, Newman is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.

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[1]As the facts set forth in Newman's original brief demonstrate, the attack on Ms. Smith occurred late at night in her dimly-lit apartment, after she had been sleeping for hours. Smith testified that she was crying throughout the attack. Under these circumstances, anything that corroborated the victim's identification was crucial to a jury believing Newman was her attacker.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing argument, Newman respectfully submits that Petitioner's request for a writ of certiorari be denied.

Respectfully submitted,
JOHN BYRON NEWMAN, Respondent.

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